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THE MAGIC MIRROR OF “ORIGINAL MEANING”:
RECENT APPROACHES TO THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Bret Boyce∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century and a half after its adoption, debate continues to rage over the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of basic rights. Of
the three clauses in the second sentence of Section One,1 the latter two (the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses) loom very large in modern Supreme Court
decisions, while the first (the Privileges or Immunities Clause) is of minimal
importance, having been invoked only once to strike down a state law.2
Originalists—those who hold that the Constitution should be interpreted according
to its original meaning—have often deplored this state of affairs. Many have
argued that from the perspective of original meaning, the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is not the least important but rather “the most important Clause in the
Amendment.”3 On this view, many of the constitutional rights today associated
with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses were originally understood to
be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For example, many
originalists have criticized the substantive due process doctrine as oxymoronic.4
Any protection of substantive rights, they insist, must be found in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, as the Due Process Clause is about procedure only.5
* Associate Professor, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. B.A. Yale University, Ph. D.
Brown University, J.D. Northwestern University School of Law. The Author thanks Saul Cornell,
Philip Hamburger and Michael J. Perry for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-11 (1999) (striking down state law limiting welfare
benefits for new residents).
3. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1517, 1532 (2008); see also EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 106 (1990) (stating that during the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, “the privileges
and immunities provision was viewed as being the most significant in terms of the rights protected”);
Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 317 (2007) (“[T]he
Privileges or Immunities Clause was supposed to be the Amendment’s major source for constitutional
protection of both civil liberty and civil equality.”).
4. See, e.g.,Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1531 (“[T]he very notion of substantive due process is an
oxymoron.”); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that
substantive due process is not a “constitutional right” but an “oxymoron”).
5. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 3, at 1531-34;see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012)(extensive recent
originalist attack on the doctrine of substantive due process). But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the
Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 594 (2009) (arguing that the due process right enshrined in the
Fifth Amendment was widely understood to have a substantive component); Ryan C. Williams, The One
and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 414-17 (2010) (arguing that the original
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Originalists have also argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Due
Process Clause, is the most plausible vehicle for the application of the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights against the states.6 Likewise, many originalists have
maintained that the Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Equal Protection
Clause, is the most important general mandate of legislative equal treatment,7 as the
Equal Protection Clause requires only equality in the provision of the protective
functions of government (which are principally executive and judicial), not in all
legislative classifications.8
The Supreme Court’s current narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause dates back to its very first decision interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Slaughter-House Cases,9 handed down only five years after the Amendment
was ratified. In that decision the Court rejected the notion that the Clause protects
a broad array of fundamental rights or that it generally prohibits discriminatory
legislation; the decision has also been read to preclude incorporation through that
Clause.10 Thus, in the view of many originalists, the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses have had to bear more weight than originally envisioned—due
process was transformed from a procedural into a substantive guarantee, while the
“equal protection of the laws” was transmogrified into the “protection of equal
laws.”11
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,12 the Supreme Court declined an invitation to
understanding of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (but not that of the Fifth
Amendment) was broad enough to encompass a recognizable form of substantive due process).
6. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 163-214
(1998).
7. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1389-91 (1992)
8. See, e.g., Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: PreEnactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2008); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense
of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 219, 219-20 (2009). Cf. Harrison, supra note 7, at 1390 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause
requires equality in “the administration of laws” or in “laws that protect,” not equality in all legislation).
9. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
10. The question at issue in Slaughter-House, whether the state had the power to create a
corporation with a monopoly on the slaughtering of livestock in New Orleans, did not implicate the
applicability of rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights to the states. But the Court maintained that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was not “intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the
legislative power of his own State.” Id. at 74. Rather, the Court insisted, it protected only such rights as
“owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” Id.
at 79. The Court’s partial enumeration of these rights in dicta consisted largely or entirely of rights visà-vis the federal government, but the Court did include “[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances, [and] the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus” on the list. Id. Some scholars
have concluded therefore that Slaughter-House did not rule out incorporation through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Kevin Christopher Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A
Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 648-49, 666-87(2000). But it is
hardly clear that the Court meant that the right to petition state governments or obtain habeas relief
against them was protected by the Clause. In any case, subsequent decisions, relying in part on
Slaughter-House, seem clearly to preclude incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause
(although Newsom argues for a contrary reading). See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
549-53 (1876).
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
12. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
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overrule Slaughter-House and restore what the plaintiffs contended was the original
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.13 In McDonald, the first
incorporation case to come before the Court in several decades, there was little
doubt that the Court was poised to hold the right in question (handgun possession
in the home) applicable against the states.14 However, the Court declined to
reground the incorporation doctrine in the Privileges or Immunities Clause rather
than the Due Process Clause.
Four Justices in the majority, led by Justice Alito, continued to adhere to the
due process approach,15 as did the four dissenting Justices.16 The Alito plurality
rejected the plaintiffs’ originalist arguments centered on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause with the laconic observation that the plaintiffs were “unable to
identify the Clause’s full scope” and that there was no “consensus on that question
among the scholars who agree that the Slaughter-House Cases’ interpretation is
flawed.”17 Likewise, Justice Stevens agreed that the original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was too uncertain to provide a proper basis for

13. See Brief for Petitioner at 65, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378912.
While arguments based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause occupied 57 pages of the Argument
section of the brief, arguments based on the Due Process Clause took up a mere seven pages. See id. at
72.
14. Two years earlier, the Court had held the right applicable against the Federal Government in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). It was clear already in Heller that the Court would
proceed to incorporate this right against the states, because the Court there held (however implausibly)
that individual self-defense was “the central component” of the Second Amendment right, and that that
right applied especially to handguns because of their popularity. Id. at 599; see also id. at 628-29. In
fact, much historical scholarship has rejected the notion that self-defense was central to the original
understanding of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law
Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1109, 1101-18
(2009); David Thomas Konig, Why the Second Amendment Has a Preamble: Original Public Meaning
and the Political Culture of Written Constitutions in Revolutionary America, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1295,
1303-07 (2009). Rather, the Second Amendment right was understood as a civic right closely bound up
with service in a well-regulated militia, not a purely individual right centered on personal self-defense,
as Justice Scalia claimed in Heller. See SAUL CORNELL, A WELL REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING
FATHERS AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 9-70 (2006). Even some originalists and
gun-rights supporters have harshly criticized Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller. See, e.g., Nelson Lund,
The Second Amendment, Heller and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009)
(criticizing the opinion as “transparently nonoriginalist” and “an embarrassment”); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, Of Guns, Abortions and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 274 (2009) (criticizing the
opinion as “a form of judicial activism” that “cannot be justified by originalism because originalism did
not dictate the outcome”). But many other originalists praised Heller as a vindication of their approach.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27,
2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion [in Heller] is the finest example of what is now called ‘original
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 980 (2009) (“Heller is certainly the
clearest and most prominent example of originalism in contemporary Supreme Court
jurisprudence . . . .”). And the McDonald majority continued to adhere to the historical analysis in
Heller, which “point[ed] unmistakably” to the subsequent incorporation of the right. McDonald, 130 S.
Ct. at 3036.
15. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030-36, 3044-48, 3050 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
16. See id. at 3088-120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (focusing on substantive due process); id. at 312036 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (focusing on due process incorporation).
17. Id. at 3030 (Alito, J.) (plurality opinion).
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modern incorporation doctrine.18 Only Justice Thomas embraced the plaintiffs’
originalist argument.19 Thomas characterized the Court’s continued reliance on the
Due Process Clause for the protection of substantive rights as a “particularly
dangerous” “legal fiction.”20 Restoration of the “original meaning” of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, Justice Thomas argued, would allow the Court “to
enforce the rights the Fourteenth Amendment is designed to protect with greater
clarity and predictability than the substantive due process framework has so far
managed.”21
This Article argues that the intractable ambiguities surrounding the historical
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Court’s retreat from originalism
in McDonald all but inevitable. As a majority of Justices there recognized, the
original understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is far from clear,
despite the enormous scholarly attention devoted to uncovering its historical
meaning. Even Justice Thomas, the Court’s most doctrinaire originalist, has
admitted that there is no scholarly consensus on this question.22 Thomas’ own
analysis of that Clause, shifting among several inconsistent definitions of privileges
and immunities without adequately exploring the differences among them,23 hardly
supports his claim that its meaning is clear and predictable. While conceding that
the legislative history of the Clause is “less than crystal clear,” Thomas drew
selectively on a handful of statements in the historical record to conclude that the
case for incorporation is unambiguous.24 As this Article will show, the same
18. See id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the original meaning of the Clause is not
as clear as [plaintiffs] suggest” and reinvigoration of the clause would only invite judicial
policymaking). Justice Breyer’s dissent simply ignored the Privileges or Immunities Clause and focused
entirely on the question of whether the right to private self-defense was “fundamental” for purposes of
the standard Due Process Clause selective incorporation approach. See, e.g., id. at 3120 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). At oral argument, even the avowed originalist Justice Scalia proved remarkably unreceptive
to the plaintiffs’ originalist arguments. To repeated outbursts of laughter, Justice Scalia dismissed the
privileges or immunities argument as the “darling of the professoriate” and sarcastically suggested that
perhaps the plaintiffs’ counsel was “bucking for . . . a place on some law school faculty.” Transcript of
Oral Argument at 7, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521). Observing that this argument was
“contrary to 140 years of our jurisprudence,” Scalia suggested that it would be better to rely on
“substantive due process, which as much as I think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.”
Id.
19. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
20. Id. at 3062. The Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, according to Justice Thomas,
lacks any “guiding principle to distinguish ‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from
nonfundamental rights that do not.” Id. In particular, Justice Thomas suggested, there can be no serious
claim that the Due Process Clause was originally understood to protect currently recognized rights of
reproductive and sexual autonomy. See id. (citing with disapproval Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
21. Id.
22. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Legal scholars agree
on little beyond the conclusion that the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873.”)
23. In the space of less than two pages, Thomas suggests that “privileges and immunities” were (1)
nonspecific synonyms “used interchangeably” for rights in general; (2) synonymous terms denoting
special rights enjoyed only by a particular subclass of persons; (3) nonsynonymous terms, where
“immunities” referred to the residuum of natural rights retained in civil society while privileges referred
to positive rights provided by society in lieu of relinquished natural rights. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at
3063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
24. Id. at 3075.
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selectivity is evident in the work of many originalist scholars, leading to wildly
differing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is not surprising, given its ambiguous text and history, that there is no
consensus among scholars and historians regarding the original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and hence of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
whole. Recent interpretations literally run the gamut from the claim that the Clause
protected no new rights, to the claim that it protected an open-ended set of rights
that can never be completely specified or enumerated. This Article focuses on the
most prominent recent originalist interpretations,25 which may be divided into two
broad methodological groups.
In the first group, Philip Hamburger and Kurt Lash have undertaken a detailed
review of the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment and have enhanced our
understanding of its historical meaning in important ways. Yet they reach
irreconcilable conclusions about the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment simply recapitulated the rights already protected by the
Comity Clause (the Privileges and Immunities Clause) of Article IV26—it merely
reiterated the preexisting constitutional prohibition of discrimination against out-ofstate residents in a limited class of state-conferred rights.27 In contrast, Lash argues
that during the antebellum period, the term “privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States” was used to refer not to state-conferred rights, but to rights
“expressly conferred by the Federal Constitution.”28 He maintains that John
Bingham, the draftsman of Section One, purposely abandoned his original language
directly tracking the Comity Clause (“privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States”) in favor of the language eventually included in the Fourteenth
Amendment (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”) in order to
make clear that the latter referred to a completely different set of rights, namely the
rights “textually enumerated” in the first eight amendments.29 Finally, Lash argues
that the public debates following Congress’ adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly during the election campaign of 1866, show that the
original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause “referred to the
personal rights enumerated in the federal Constitution.”30 Lash’s views on the
25. For a discussion of earlier scholarly interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
which similarly run the gamut from extremely narrow to quite expansive, see Bret Boyce, Originalism
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 987-1026 (1998).
26. Some scholars refer to both clauses as the “Privileges and Immunities Clause.” To avoid
confusion, this article will distinguish in nomenclature between the Comity Clause (or Privileges and
Immunities Clause) of Article IV and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
27. See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (2011).
28. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241, 1245 (2010) [hereinafter Lash, Origins
Part I].
29. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and
the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 334 (2011) [hereinafter Lash, Origins
Part II].
30. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part III: Andrew Johnson and
the Constitutional Referendum of 1866, 101 GEO. L.J. 1275, 1282 (2013) [hereinafter Lash, Origins Part
III].
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original meaning of that Clause have evolved considerably over time. Although he
once wrote that it “seems tailor-made for the recognition of nontextual fundamental
freedoms,”31 he has since repudiated that position. His current view is that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects “the substantive personal rights listed in
the first eight Amendments, as well as the equal rights of sojourning citizens
protected under the Comity Clause of Article IV.”32
The second methodological group is much less concerned with detailed
historical inquiry. These scholars typically stress that what matters is the “original
public meaning” of a constitutional provision rather than the framers’ specific
expectations as to how it would be applied. Indeed, those specific expectations
may be ignored where they contradict the “original public meaning.” Critically,
scholars in this group tend to formulate the “original public meaning” at a very
high and abstract level of generality, broad enough to justify results that the framers
and ratifiers would not have contemplated and in many cases specifically
disavowed. They typically rely on a handful of statements in the historical record
as conclusive of the original public meaning, and hence they shed little new light
on the Amendment’s historical meaning. But their methodology enables them to
reach virtually any result that is consistent with current doctrine, as well as results
that are more or less expansive. Such abstract approaches are not significantly less
constraining than most nonoriginalist approaches; indeed, this “new originalism” is
typically less constraining and more indeterminate than common law
constitutionalism.
In this second group, Steven Calabresi has deployed such arguments to defend
well-entrenched aspects of modern judicial doctrine while rejecting any major new
extensions. For example, he proposes an originalist defense of the modern doctrine
that the Fourteenth Amendment bans sex discrimination, despite the framers’
explicit disavowal that it would have that effect.33 In general, Calabresi endorses
those decisions whose repudiation would be a serious embarrassment for moderate
conservatives (those banning school segregation and sex discrimination, or
recognizing rights of contraception and racial intermarriage), while ruling out
judicial protection of rights still widely rejected by conservative opinion (such as
abortion or same-sex marriage).34 According to Calabresi, “the Fourteenth
Amendment is not a license to the Supreme Court to engage in transformative
change.”35 In contrast, Jack Balkin deploys a new originalist approach (which he
calls “framework originalism”36) to defend politically liberal results, arguing
provocatively that “the debate between originalism and living constitutionalism

31. Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill of
Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 500 (1999).
32. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1282; see also Kurt T. Lash, Beyond Incorporation, 18
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 447, 460 & n.49 (2009) [hereinafter Beyond Incorporation] (describing
Lash’s evolution on this question).
33. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1,
4-11 (2011).
34. See Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice For All?, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 150-55 (2011).
35. Id. at 149.
36. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011).

36

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1

rests on a false dichotomy.”37 Balkin’s originalism not only defends most of the
modern Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence (including, perhaps most
controversially, its abortion decisions38), but is open to further transformative
doctrinal developments. Randy Barnett’s approach is even more revolutionary. He
argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both “natural or inherent
liberty rights” and positive law rights,39 and that the natural rights thus protected
are “literally boundless” and “unenumerable.”40 Although a case can be made for
each of those positions, this Article argues that a significant case can also be made
against each of them. The historical evidence simply does not permit any confident
assertion regarding the exact scope of the rights protected, or the abridgments
prohibited, by the Privileges or Immunities Clause or by the Fourteenth
Amendment as a whole.
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that in the law, “as in a magic mirror, we see
reflected, not only our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been!”41 Given
the vagueness and ambiguity of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, the multifarious
history of its framing and ratification, and the flexibility of current “public meaning
originalism,” it is not surprising that public meaning originalists have reached such
dramatically divergent conclusions about its proper interpretation and construction.
When they peer into the magic mirror of its meaning, originalists tend to see
reflected their own political philosophies and ideological presumptions.
This Article concludes that the absence of a clear original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause (or of Section One as a whole) is a strong reason
for rejecting originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. The second
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is the central text on which the system of
protection of individual rights in our constitutional order rests, and the failure of
originalist scholars to construct a convincing and generally accepted account of its
meaning is a powerful indictment of originalism.
For nearly a century and a half, the Fourteenth Amendment has been infused
with meaning through an evolutionary process of common-law adjudication. The
legitimacy of the doctrines thus established (such as incorporation, the prohibition
of sex discrimination, the ban on racial segregation in public schools, the oneperson-one-vote rule, or the unconstitutionality of miscegenation laws) does not
rest on their compatibility with the original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However tenuously grounded in original meaning, such doctrines are
secure as a matter of actual constitutional practice. That practice is characterized
by an incrementalist and instrumentalist common-law approach42 that, despite its
flaws, has broadly provided both sufficient stability to guarantee the rule of law and
37. Balkin, supra note 3, at 292.
38. See id. at 319-40.
39. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 63
(2004).
40. Id. at 55-57.
41. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Law, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 17 (1891).
Holmes’s dictum and his views about the importance of history for the understanding of law inspired the
title for KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2d ed.
2009).
42. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3, 33-49 (2010) (describing the
common law approach of constitutional interpretation and contrasting it with originalism).
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the flexibility to permit evolutionary change and increasing protection of equality
and human dignity within our constitutional order.
II. RECENT ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATIONS
Over the past two decades, as various theorists have sought to refine and
redefine originalism in response to internal and external criticism, the “new
originalism” that has emerged has increasingly focused on theories of language and
interpretation.43 There exists today a wide variety of originalist approaches, so
much so that some have argued originalism is losing its coherence and its
usefulness as a descriptive term.44 Thomas Colby has helpfully catalogued the
most important theoretical moves of the new originalism as follows, with the
caveat that while “[v]irtually every originalist has embraced at least some of these
moves, . . . only a few have explicitly embraced all of them”:
(a) the move from original intent to original meaning; (b) the move from
subjective meaning to objective meaning; (c) the move from actual to hypothetical
understanding; (d) the embrace of standards and general principles; (e) the
embrace of broad levels of generality; (f) the move from original expected
application to original objective principles; (g) the distinction between
interpretation and construction; and (h) the distinction between normative and
45
semantic originalism.

Indeed many of these moves are hardly “new.” For example, Justice Antonin
Scalia and Robert Bork rejected “original intent” in favor of “original public
meaning” as long ago as the 1980s, and most originalists have followed them.46
But as Colby has pointed out, although collectively these moves have addressed
many of the practical and theoretical defects of earlier forms of originalism, they
have rendered modern originalism so indeterminate as to sacrifice “any pretense of
a power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”47
Of the originalist scholars whose work is examined here, Hamburger and Lash
pay closest attention to the historical record. Hamburger seems to eschew even the
term “originalism” itself, as well as its recent theoretical apparatus, although he is
clearly engaged in a search for the “historical meaning”48 of the Constitution,
43. Some influential representative examples of new originalist approaches include: KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611
(1999); and Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427 (2007).
44. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 244-46,
256-67 (2009).
45. Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 719-20 (2011).
46. See Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic
Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ORIGINAL MEANING
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987) (suggesting a “campaign to change the label from the
Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original Meaning”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (arguing that originalists seek not the
“subjective intention” of the framers but “what the public of that time would have understood the words
to mean”).
47. Colby, supra note 45, at 714.
48. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 63.
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which he treats as normatively binding. Lash embraces “‘original public meaning
originalism’ as a normatively attractive approach to constitutional interpretation,”
stressing that “the personal intentions of the framers . . . hav[e] weight only to the
degree that they reflect or illuminate the likely public understanding of the text.”49
The remaining scholars discussed here embrace most or all of the
hermeneutical moves of the new originalism.50 Calabresi, Balkin, and Barnett all
take as their starting point the position that only the original semantic meaning of
the text (which they all construe at a high level of abstraction), not the framers’
expectations regarding the application of the text, is binding. Yet given the
indeterminacy of the bare text of the Fourteenth Amendment, despite their rejection
of expectations-based originalism, all rely heavily in practice not just on arguments
about the semantic meaning of its language in its historical context, but on specific
statements by the framers as perhaps the most important evidence of its likely
public meaning. Yet rather than comprehensively canvassing the historical record,
they tend to seize on a handful of specific statements to establish a highly abstract
“original meaning,” upon which they proceed to erect a fairly elaborate
superstructure of constitutional construction that is not closely tethered to the
framers’ and ratifiers’ historical understandings.
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINALISM
1. Hamburger: Interjurisdictional Discrimination
Philip Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protected exactly the same rights as the Comity Clause
(Privileges and Immunities Clause) of Article IV.51 That is, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was not a guarantee of a fixed set of substantive rights (whether
natural rights of property and contract, or, as incorporationists have argued, the
specific rights protected in the federal Bill of Rights), nor was it a prohibition of
discrimination by a state against its own citizens. Rather, “the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protected Comity Clause rights”52—it served simply to prohibit
states from discriminating against citizens (especially black citizens) from other
states.
As Hamburger concedes, if this is really the “historical meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause,” it may “seem strangely
redundant and poorly expressed.”53 Hamburger’s interpretation does indeed make
the Clause seem redundant, because it is unclear how it adds anything new to the
Constitution. It is certainly true, as Hamburger amply documents, that during the
antebellum period blacks seeking to travel interstate were denied Comity Clause
rights (and often barred from entering other states altogether) on the ground that

49. Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 338-39.
50. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 89-130; JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-125 (2011);
Balkin, supra note 43; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U.
L. REV. 549 (2009).
51. See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 122.
52. Id. at 145.
53. Id. at 68.
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they were not citizens,54 and there was doubt about whether Congress had the
power to enforce the Comity Clause.55 But the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment56 made clear that blacks were indeed national and state
citizens, while the Enforcement Clause57 gave Congress the power to protect their
rights. It is thus hard to see what the Privileges or Immunities Clause added, if it
merely recapitulated the Comity Clause. And while the language of Article IV’s
Comity Clause58 clearly protects out-of-state citizens when visiting another state,
the language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause59
seems to protect all citizens of the United States in every state (whether citizens of
the state in question or out-of-staters).
However, Hamburger argues that the Privileges or Immunities Clause must be
understood within a “genealogy of ideas . . . from at least 1821 to 1866, that
concerned the mobility of free blacks and that often was framed in terms of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”60 This genealogy of
ideas, he argues, is not merely “a context but the context”61 that furnishes the key
to the Clause’s meaning.
Hamburger’s starting point is the debates in Congress following the admission
of Missouri as a slave state under the Compromise of 1820. The new constitution
of Missouri, which not only protected slavery but also required the exclusion of
free blacks from the state, threatened to unravel that compromise, triggering a
round of debates in 1821 focusing on the citizenship and Comity Clause rights of
free blacks.62 The new crisis was defused by the passage of a congressional
resolution, drafted by Henry Clay, reciting that the Missouri Constitution “shall
never be construed to authorize the passage of any law . . . by which any citizen, of
either of the States in this Union, shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of
the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the
Constitution of the United States.”63 Although this episode did little to resolve
controversies over the meaning and scope of the Comity Clause or the rights of free
blacks, its significance for Hamburger is that it raised the prospect that Comity
Clause rights could be treated as national rights enforceable by the federal
government.64
As Hamburger discusses, after the Missouri episode focused debate on the

54. See id. at 83-100.
55. See id. at 121-22.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
60. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 66.
61. Id. at 133.
62. See id. at 84-86.
63. 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1830 (1821).
64. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 88 (the 1821 episode “forcefully refocused the debate about
privileges and immunities on the question of federal citizenship”).
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interrelationship between rights and citizenship, and on the citizenship rights of
blacks in particular, a number of U.S. attorneys general65 and state courts66
concluded that because free blacks were denied certain rights (especially political
rights), they could not be regarded as citizens for statutory or constitutional
purposes. In this context, Hamburger argues, the most famous antebellum Comity
Clause decision, Corfield v. Coryell,67 must be reevaluated. Although that case
ostensibly had nothing to do with the rights of free blacks, Hamburger discerns a
“racist” agenda behind Justice Washington’s opinion, which he considers “a
precursor of Dred Scott.”68 As a slaveholder anxious to exclude free blacks from
citizenship, Hamburger argues, Justice Washington included suffrage among the
privileges and immunities of citizens because “[p]olitical rights were the standard
example of what blacks did not have.”69
Thus, Hamburger argues, those who opposed slavery and championed the
rights of free blacks spoke increasingly of Comity Clause rights as privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States. For example, in an 1854 debate,
Senator Sumner referred to the imprisonment and enslavement of black
Massachusetts citizens in the South as a violation of “the privileges and immunities

65. See id. at 89-93. The first of these opinions, by Attorney General William Wirt, argued that
because free blacks in Virginia could not vote, hold office, testify against whites, serve in the militia, or
marry white persons, they were not state citizens and hence not federal citizens. Rights of Free Virginia
Negroes, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 506, 506-09 (1821). Wirt’s analysis specifically referred to the Comity
Clause. Id. at 507. Although Wirt’s opinion left open the possibility that some free blacks (those in
states that granted them equal rights with whites) might be U.S. citizens, a later U.S. Attorney General,
Roger B. Taney in 1832, went even further and insisted in an unpublished opinion (25 years before his
decision in Dred Scott) that no blacks could be U.S. citizens. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B.
TANEY 154 (1935). Attorneys General John MacPherson Berrien and Caleb Cushing also issued
opinions rejecting black citizenship. See Validity of the South Carolina Police Bill, 2 Op. Att’y Gen.
426 (1831) (Berrien); Relation of Indians to Citizenship, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 746 (1856) (Cushing); Right
of Expiration, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 139 (1858) (Cushing). Hugh Legaré, who concluded that blacks were
eligible to purchase federal lands reserved to citizens, but expressly declined to decide whether they
were to be considered citizens for political purposes, was only a partial exception to this trend. See Preemption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 147 (1843). See generally MARK A. GRABER,
DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 & n.84 (2006) (citing all these opinions);
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
361 (1978) ( “[T]he general tendency of federal executive rulings had indeed been unfavorable to Negro
citizenship.”). The view that blacks were not citizens was repudiated only in 1862, by Lincoln’s first
attorney general, Edward Bates. See Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382 (1862).
66. Hamburger focuses on Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 334 (1822), which held that free
blacks could not be citizens, and Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 345-47 (1834), in which the Chief
Justice of Connecticut reached the same conclusion. See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 91-93. He could
have cited many more. In fact, “virtually every state court that ruled on black citizenship before 1857
[when Dred Scott was decided] concluded that free persons of color were neither state nor American
citizens.” GRABER, supra note 65, at 29. Graber cites case law from 18 jurisdictions, including free
states such as (in addition to Connecticut) Pennsylvania, California, and Indiana. See id. n.83. Indeed,
“[t]he Supreme [Judicial] Court of Massachusetts was the only bench that, before Dred Scott, clearly
indicated that free blacks were state citizens.” Id. (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
198, 206 (1849)).
67. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
68. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 146.
69. Id. at 96. See also id. at 97-100 (discussing Dred Scott); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 405-11 (1857) (Chief Justice Taney’s discussion of black citizenship).
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of citizens of the United States.”70 In 1858, free blacks in Boston petitioned the
state legislature to protect black citizens of Massachusetts seeking to visit the South
from violations of “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”71 In
the 1859 debate over the admission of Oregon to the Union with a constitution that
would have barred entry to free blacks, Representative John Bingham insisted that
the proposed state constitution would violate the Comity Clause’s guarantee of the
“privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States.”72
Finally, Hamburger observes that during the same period that the Fourteenth
Amendment was being drafted, Congress “briefly considered” a bill proposed by
Representative Samuel Shellabarger “[t]o declare and protect all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States.”73 Although
Shellabarger’s Privileges and Immunities Bill received only very limited attention
in Congress and was never enacted because of constitutional objections,74
Hamburger views it as the “missing link” that connects the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause to the antebellum Comity Clause
debates stretching back to the Missouri Compromise.”75
While Hamburger’s “genealogy of ideas” thus provides a context explaining
how the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause could have been
understood to refer simply to Comity Clause rights, it is far from clear that it
provides, as he claims, the context. Hamburger concedes that “some statements in
the debates could be understood as alluding to incorporation.”76 The most
important of these was the speech of Senator Jacob M. Howard introducing the
Fourteenth Amendment on the floor of the Senate,77 which forms the lynchpin of
the originalist argument for incorporation. Howard began his discussion of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause by referring to the rights protected by the Comity
Clause. He observed that the Supreme Court had never resolved the “curious
question” 78 of the scope of the Comity Clause, but quoted at length from the “very
learned and excellent” Justice Bushrod Washington’s circuit court decision in
Corfield v. Coryell as an authoritative exposition.79 Howard then continued: “To
70. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 108 (quoting the debate as reported in a black newspaper, 8
NAT’L ERA (D.C.) 119 (1854)).
71. Id. at 110 (quoting William C. Nell & Other Colored Citizens of Massachusetts, Rights of
Colored Citizens, 29 LIBERATOR (Bos.) 11 (1859)).
72. Id. at 112 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981, 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. John
Bingham)).
73. Id. at 115 n.187 (quoting H.R. 437, 39th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr.
2, 1866)).
74. See id. at 117-22.
75. Id. at 116.
76. Id. at 131.
77. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
78. Id. at 2765.
79. Id. According to the passage in Justice Washington’s opinion quoted by Senator Howard, the
privileges and immunities protected by the Comity Clause are confined
to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been
enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are,
it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all
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these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be—for they are not and
cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature—to these should be
added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments of
the Constitution,”80 which he then proceeded to summarize. After observing that
under existing law Congress had no power to enforce those provisions and that “the
States are not restrained from violating the principles embraced in them except by
their own local constitutions, which may be altered from year to year,” Howard
concluded: “The great object of the first section of this amendment is . . . to restrain
the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect these great
fundamental guarantees.”81 Howard thus seemed clearly to state that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights.
Hamburger labors mightily to reconcile these statements with his view that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only Comity Clause rights. When
Howard stated that the Fourteenth Amendment would compel the states to respect
“the principles embraced in” the federal Bill of Rights, Hamburger argues he must
have meant that the states would have to respect “these principles, as guaranteed in
state bills of rights,” because the Fourteenth Amendment requires
interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional equality of treatment (under the Privileges
or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses respectively).82 While clever, this
reading seems forced and improbable. After all, Howard complained that the
problem with relying on state constitutions was that they “may be altered from year
to year,” and he asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment would remedy this by
requiring the states “at all times” to respect those guarantees. The clear implication
is that the Fourteenth Amendment would protect the rights guaranteed in the
federal Bill of Rights from state infringement regardless of the vicissitudes of state
law. Moreover, Howard suggested that the Amendment would supersede Barron v.
Baltimore,83 which had held that the federal Takings Clause did not bind the
states.84 But under Hamburger’s reading, the Fourteenth Amendment would not
comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a
citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take,
hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some
of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are,
strictly speaking, privileges and immunities . . . .
Id. (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2766.
82. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 131 (emphasis added).
83. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
84. Id. at 2765 (“[I]t has been repeatedly held that the restriction contained in the Constitution
against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation is not a restriction upon
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supersede Barron (many state constitutions at the time had no takings clause).85
Hamburger argues that the historical and sociological context points to crossjurisdictional equality rather than incorporation as the goal of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause: “Blacks had little need for assurances of any particular
substantive federal rights, let alone incorporation. But they had a great need for
federal guarantees of voting, due process, and especially equality—both local
equality and cross-jurisdictional equality.”86 This is only half right. The
overwhelming focus of the debates over both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment was unequal treatment, as embodied especially in the new
Black Codes.87 There was little discussion of the need for incorporation of
State legislation, but applies only to the legislation of Congress.”). Barron was the leading such
decision, although Howard did not refer to it by name.
85. The Maryland Constitution contained no takings clause, and while the trial court had granted
relief, citing the state constitution’s due process provision and general principles of natural law, the
Maryland Court of Appeals reversed. See Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (2007). Thus, under Hamburger’s reading, the Fourteenth Amendment would
have afforded the plaintiff in Barron no relief.
86. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 71.
87. The primary purpose of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment was
to prohibit the widespread restrictions on civil rights embodied in the Black Codes passed in the former
Confederate states. For example, the drafter of the Civil Rights Bill, Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois, stated that its purpose was “to destroy all these discriminations” and to protect “[s]uch
fundamental rights as belong to every free person.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
Trumbull noted that the Comity Clause protected such rights against interstate discrimination but
insisted that it was necessary to go further and protect them against intrastate discrimination: “[H]ow
much more are the native born citizens of the State itself entitled to these rights!” Id. at 475. Likewise,
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, the most influential member of the House of Representatives,
seemed to view the Fourteenth Amendment as a simple antidiscrimination provision. According to
Stevens, the Amendment merely ensured that legislation must be “equal, impartial to all.” Id. at 1063.
When Stevens introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the House, he indicated that while some might
say “[y]our civil rights bill secures the same things,” the Amendment, by enshrining the protections of
the Civil Rights Act into the Constitution, secured them against repeal by a subsequent majority in
Congress. Id. at 2459. Most speakers who discussed Section One in the ensuing debate in the House
similarly argued, as Stevens had, that it simply constitutionalized the principles of the Civil Rights Act,
or that it established beyond doubt Congress’ power to enact that Act. For example, Rep. James A.
Garfield (R. Ohio) (future President of the United States) stated that the purpose of Section One was to
protect the principles of the Civil Rights Act from repeal: “[W]e propose to lift that great and good law
above the reach of political strife, beyond the reach of the plots and machinations of any party, and fix it
in the serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the Constitution . . . .” Id. at 2462. Rep. Martin R. Thayer
(R. Pa.) stated that the Amendment “is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the
principle of the civil rights bill.” Id. at 2465. Rep. John H. Broomall (R. Pa.) indicated that the House
had already voted for the principles underlying the Amendment “in another shape, in the civil rights
bill,” and thus the House was merely asked to “put a provision in the Constitution which is already
contained in an act of Congress.” Id. at 2498. Rep. Henry J. Raymond (R. N.Y.) indicated that the
principle underlying Section One, “which secures an equality of rights among all the citizens of the
United States” was “first embodied in” the Bingham Amendment, and then “came before us in the form
of a bill, by which Congress proposed to exercise precisely the powers the amendment was intended to
confer.” Id. at 2502. Raymond’s statement is interesting, because just like Bingham, he was one of the
few Republicans to vote against the Civil Rights Act out of constitutional scruples, but he supported the
principles behind it and voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rep. Thomas D. Eliot (R. Mass.),
who voted for the Civil Rights Act on the conviction that it was constitutional, supported Section One in
order “to incorporate into the Constitution provisions which will settle the doubt which some gentlemen
entertain upon that question.” Id. at 2511. Additionally, about a month after the Amendment had
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substantive federal guarantees, but cross-jurisdictional equality was not the
principal focus of concern either. Shellabarger’s bill received only perfunctory
consideration and was never passed, while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the
subject of enormous attention and debate. Overwhelmingly, the framers were
concerned about discrimination by the states against their own citizens. This was
the focus of the Civil Rights Act, and speaker after speaker indicated that Section
One simply constitutionalized the principles of that Act. It is true many were
vague as to the precise meaning of each clause in Section One, and in many
particular passages in the debates one often cannot rule out Hamburger’s reading.
But if the Privileges or Immunities Clause was simply a redundant recapitulation of
the Comity Clause it is hard to see how it had the importance that the framers
seemed to attribute to it. Hamburger’s approach shifts the Amendment’s primary
guarantee of equal rights onto the Equal Protection Clause—a reading that is in line
with modern doctrine but that arguably erases that Clause’s original textual focus
on protection.
It is worth remembering how limited the scope of the Comity Clause was as a
guarantee of the rights of free blacks not only for the defenders of slavery (such as
Chief Justice Taney), but also for its opponents. Justice Curtis, whose robust
refutation of Taney in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott elevated the idea of
black citizenship to what Hamburger calls “a central antislavery position,”88 had a
surprisingly limited view of the rights attendant upon that citizenship:
To what citizens the elective franchise shall be confided, is a question to be
determined by each State, in accordance with its own views of the necessities or
expediencies of its condition. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its citizens, and
whether all shall enjoy the same, or how they may be gained or lost, are to be
determined in the same way. One [State] may confine the right of suffrage to
white male citizens; another may extend it to colored persons and females; one
may allow all persons above a prescribed age to convey property and transact
89
business; another may exclude married women.

This is a remarkably cramped and indeed almost empty vision of citizenship.
The states may allocate or withhold rights among their citizens precisely as they
see fit, freely abridging them on the basis of race or gender. Hamburger demonizes
Justice Washington’s position as “racist” and lionizes Justice Curtis as articulating
the vision of privileges and immunities of citizenship “which would eventually . . .
already passed the House, Rep. Henry Van Aernam (R. N.Y.) stated that it gave “constitutional sanction
and protection to the substantial guarantees of the civil rights bill.” Id. at 3069. Democrats who
opposed the measure did so because they likewise understood it as embodying the principles of the Civil
Rights Act. See, e.g., id. at 2461 (remarks of Rep. William E. Finck (D. Ohio)) (arguing that necessity
of adopting Section One showed that the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional); id. at 2506 (remarks of
Charles A. Eldridge (D. Wis.)) (also arguing that the amendment was an “admission” that the Civil
Rights Act was unconstitutional); id. at 2467 (remarks of Rep. Benjamin M. Boyer (D. Pa.)) (“The first
section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill . . . .”); id. at 2530 (remarks of Rep. Samuel J.
Randall (D. Pa.) (“The first section proposes to make an equality in every respect between the two
races . . . .”); id. at 2538 (remarks of Rep. Andrew J. Rogers (D. N.J.) (“[Section One] is no more nor
less than an attempt to embody in the Constitution of the United States that outrageous and miserable
civil rights bill . . . .”).
88. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 104.
89. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 583 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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be secured in the Fourteenth Amendment.”90 Yet the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment cited Justice Washington far more than Justice Curtis. Many of them
evidently combined Curtis’s insistence on black citizenship with Washington’s
claim that citizenship entails a broad and irreducible scope of substantive rights.
2. Lash: The Bill of Rights
In sharp contrast to Hamburger, Kurt Lash rejects the idea that the meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is rooted in the
Comity Clause of Article IV. Instead, in Lash’s view, the term “privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States” refers to “rights expressly conferred by
the Federal Constitution,” principally defined in the first eight amendments.91 The
effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was thus to nationalize those rights by
making them applicable against the states.92 However, Lash rejects the use of the
“incorporation” to describe this process, because he insists that the focus should be
not “on the meaning of the texts when first added to the constitution in 1791” (at
the time of ratification of the first ten amendments), but rather on “how the rights
represented by these texts were understood in 1868” (at the time of the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment).93 Thus, paradoxically, while Lash endorses
“original public meaning originalism,”94 he admits the possibility that the
Fourteenth Amendment crystallized a transformation in the meaning of the rights
protected through a process of nonoriginalist or common-law evolution.95
In the first article of a three-part series exploring the origins of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, Lash begins by examining the usage of the terms
“privileges” and “immunities” at the time of the founding. Although in isolation
these terms could be used interchangeably to refer to almost any sort of rights, Lash
argues that the paired terms “privileges and immunities” referred to “rights
belonging to a certain group of people or a particular institution.”96 The dominant
understanding of Article IV’s protection of the “Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States” among antebellum judges and commentators was
that it required only that states grant to out-of-state citizens “equal access to a
limited set of state-protected rights.”97 In Corfield v. Coryell, 98 Justice Washington
continued to adhere to this approach, although he read the set of protected rights
more broadly than his predecessors, as including political rights. Washington also
referred to the class of protected rights as those “which are, in their nature,

90. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 97.
91. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1245.
92. See Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 32, at 460.
93. Id. at 455.
94. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1247.
95. See Lash, Beyond Incorporation, supra note 32, at 456-59 (arguing, by way of example, that
while examination of theological questions by the courts would have been acceptable at the time of the
Founding, by the time of Reconstruction it was seen as a violation of the non-establishment principle).
96. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1257.
97. Id. at 1260. As Lash observes, this was the approach taken in the leading early cases, including
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797), and Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y.
1812).
98. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states.”99 But
Lash argues that no court or commentator prior to the Civil War read Corfield as
referring to a nationally mandated set of substantive rights—“[i]t was only after
1865 that radical Republicans, and proponents of women’s suffrage,” took that
position.100 Rather, courts continued to treat the Comity Clause as requiring equal
access to a limited set of state-conferred rights, and the year after the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, the Supreme Court endorsed that view in Paul v.
Virginia.101
In contrast to Article IV’s “Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States,” which referred to state-conferred rights, Lash argues that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” refers to
“rights conferred by the Federal Constitution.”102 Lash finds antecedents for the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause in
international treaties and implementing legislation.103 For example, the Louisiana
Cession Act promised to extend to the inhabitants of Louisiana “all the rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”104 Likewise, the
Adams-Onís Treaty guaranteed to the inhabitants of Florida “all the privileges,
rights, and immunities, of the citizens of the United States,”105 and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed to the inhabitants of Texas “all the rights of citizens
of the United States.”106
Of course, the language of these treaties is not exactly the same as the
language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and varies from one treaty to the
next. Moreover, the context in which the treaties were framed is very different
from the debates over civil rights during Reconstruction. As Hamburger puts it, the
cession treaties and the Reconstruction-era debates over privileges and immunities
“involved different problems, texts and meanings.”107 Moreover, there is little
reason to think that that the rights guaranteed to new citizens under the cession
treaties were limited to federal constitutional rights; surely they also included rights
under international law and federal statutory rights, as well as rights of citizens
under territorial law, and once the territory was admitted to statehood, under state
law, as early decisions confirm.108

99. Id. at 551.
100. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1266.
101. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869). See Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1280. As Lash
notes, Chief Justice Taney’s theory of the Comity Clause in Dred Scott was also “quite conventional.”
Id. at 1276 (discussing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1857)).
102. Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1282.
103. See id. at 1285-87.
104. Treaty Between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., art. III, Apr.
30, 1803, 8 Stat. 200.
105. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, art. VI, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
106. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex.,
art. IX, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922.
107. Hamburger, supra note 27, at 106.
108. See, e.g., Desbois’ Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 285 (La. 1812) (right to practice law); U.S. v. Laverty, 26
F. Cas. 875, 875-77 (C.C.D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569a) (immunity from restrictions imposed on alien
enemies).
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Lash finds support for his argument that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
refers specifically to federal constitutional rights in arguments made in Congress in
1819 over a proposal by Representative James Tallmadge to condition the
admission of Missouri on the gradual abolition of slavery.109 Opponents of this
proposal argued, among other things, that it violated the Louisiana Cession
Treaty’s promise of the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the
United States,” on the theory that the citizens of the new state of Missouri should
have the same right as the citizens of other states to institute slavery under their
chosen republican institutions.110 Proponents, such as Daniel Webster and David
Morill, retorted that the right to establish slavery depended on state law rather than
the federal Constitution, and was therefore not protected by the treaty.111 Because
both sides in this debate focused on federal constitutional rights, Lash concludes
that they all “distinguished the national rights, privileges and immunities”
guaranteed under the Cession Treaty “from the state-conferred rights, privileges,
and immunities guarded under Article IV.”112
It is not clear that this rather obscure debate sheds any light on the eventual
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Only a small part of the debate
over the Tallmadge proposal focused on the clause in the cession treaty, which in
any case was worded differently from the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The
fact that the discussion of the cession treaty clause focused on federal constitutional
rights is not surprising. Missouri was not yet a state, so no rights under state law
yet existed, much less issues involving sojourning citizens from out of state. But as
Lash himself points out, Webster’s and Morill’s discussions of federal
constitutional rights involved “structural guarantees of federalism and access to
federal courts,”113 not the guarantees of the first eight amendments.
In the second article in his series, Lash explores the development of John
Bingham’s ideas in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment and the reception
of those ideas by Bingham’s colleagues in Congress.114 As Lash observes,
“Bingham left a trail of conflicting statements regarding the meaning of Article IV,
the nature of the Bill of Rights, and the relationship of both to the proposed
Fourteenth Amendment.”115 While early in the debates of 1866 Bingham claimed
that his proposed amendment was based on the Comity Clause, by 1871, well after
the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified, he stated that the Amendment
protected completely different rights than the Comity Clause, namely the rights
guaranteed by the first eight amendments.116 While in 1866 Bingham treated the
Comity Clause as part of the “bill of rights,” in 1871 he limited the “bill of rights”
to the first eight amendments to the Constitution, more or less tracking the modern
definition.117 While in 1866 he seemed to ignore or reject the doctrine of Barron v.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Lash, Origins Part I, supra note 28, at 1288-96.
See id. at 1288-90.
See id. at 1290-93.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
See Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 334.
Id. at 335.
See id.
See id.
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Baltimore, in 1871 he “described Barron as ‘rightfully’ decided.”118
Because Bingham was the principal draftsman of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, his views are important. Unfortunately, as Lash
recognizes, he was often less than fully clear and consistent. To his credit, Lash
seeks to explore and explain these inconsistencies, rather than to deny that they
exist, as many originalist incorporationists have done.
To assess Lash’s approach, it is useful first to survey Bingham’s contributions
to the debates during and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bingham first proposed a constitutional amendment on December 6, 1865, but it
languished in committee for more than two months. As eventually reported out in
February 1866, Bingham’s amendment provided:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States
119
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).

This prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as the “Bingham
Amendment,” was extensively debated from February 26 to 28, 1866. Bingham
opened the debate by claiming that “[e]very word of the proposed amendment is today in the Constitution of our country, save the words conferring the express grant
of power upon the Congress of the United States.”120 This was of course not
exactly true. To substantiate his claim, Bingham specifically quoted the Article IV
Comity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; but curiously, the
February proposal did not mention due process, and conversely, of course there
was no equal protection provision in the antebellum Constitution. Repeatedly in
these early debates Bingham seemed to conflate the ideas of privileges and
immunities, due process, and equal protection, making it difficult to discern
precisely what meaning he attached to each of the three corresponding clauses in
the final version. He also claimed that the substantive requirements imposed by the
new amendment—not just the Article IV obligations, but much more
controversially those drawn from the Fifth Amendment (with the extra-textual
gloss of equal protection)—were already binding on the states “by the very letter of
the Constitution.”121
Unfortunately, Bingham continued, it was well established “by every
construction of the Constitution, . . . that these great provisions of the Constitution,
this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution
and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States.”122 What did Bingham
mean by this reference to the “bill of rights”? The grammatical antecedent of the
phrase “these great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights”

118. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871)).
119. BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON
RECONSTRUCTION 61 (1914). The parenthetical references to the Constitution were included in the
version passed by the Committee but removed in the version ultimately reported back out to the House
on February 3.
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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appears to be the Article IV Comity Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause just quoted.123 In other words, when in February 1866 Bingham
invoked “this immortal bill of rights” he appeared to refer to the Comity and Due
Process Clauses, not the first eight (or ten) amendments.
Those who assert that from beginning to end Bingham consistently and clearly
advocated incorporation of the first eight amendments have scoffed at this idea,
arguing that the term “bill of rights” must have meant in 1866 what it means
today.124 But that is profoundly anachronistic. In 1866 the term “bill of rights” had
a wide range of meanings in constitutional discourse, not the fixed and uniform
meaning it has today. Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court never used the term “bill of rights” to refer to the first eight (or ten)
amendments, although it did repeatedly use the term to refer to the guarantees of
Article I, Section 10 of the unamended Constitution.125 Joseph Story noted that
that the opponents of the 1789-91 amendments argued that the unamended
Constitution “itself, was, in every rational sense . . . a Bill of Rights for the
Union.”126 In 1865, Senator Charles Sumner (R.-Mass.) referred to the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as “in itself alone a whole Bill of
Rights.”127 In his influential Manual of the Constitution, which was exactly
contemporaneous with the Fourteenth Amendment, Timothy Farrar uses the term
“bill of rights” much more expansively, to refer to provisions in the 1789
Constitution (such as the Contracts Clause, the Habeas Corpus Clause, and the
Comity Clause) as well as various provisions in the 1791 amendments, although
elsewhere he uses the term in its modern sense.128 On the other hand, we can also
point to examples in the debates in Congress during the framing of the Fourteenth
123. Charles Fairman was the first scholar to call attention to Bingham’s use of the term “bill of
rights” in this context. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 26, 33-34 (1949).
124. See, e.g., William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 25, 27-28 (1954) (arguing that the
words “these great provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights” in Bingham’s speech
“did not have any antecedent,” and that Bingham was probably waving a copy of the constitution at the
time he uttered them); AMAR, supra note 6, at 183 (“[I]t is astonishing that some scholars . . . have
suggested that when Bingham invoked ‘the bill of rights,’ he didn’t mean what he said.”).
125. See AMAR, supra note 6, at 164, 284-88.
126. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 256
(Boston, Marsh, Capen, Lyon & Webb 1840). Story explained: “It specifies, and declares the political
privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the Government. It defines certain
immunities and modes of proceeding, which relate to their personal, private, and public rights and
concerns.” Id. (emphasis added). Of course, this argument did not satisfy the proponents of
amendments.
127. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480 (1864).
128. See TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
510-14 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1867). Elsewhere Farrar uses the term in its modern sense, but
refers to the amendments as “[a]rticles, in the nature of a bill of rights,” suggesting that the term “bill of
rights” did not have a fixed meaning at the time. Id. at 392. Francis Lieber’s 1865 proposal of
amendments to the Constitution, which foreshadow the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in
interesting ways, refers to the English Bill of Rights and states that the Declaration of Independence
“may be considered as the American Bill of Rights,” but does not refer to the 1791 Amendments as a
bill of rights. FRANCIS LIEBER, AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, SUBMITTED TO THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 6, 11, 18 (New York, Loyal Publication Society 1865).
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Amendment, and in contemporary treatises, where the term “bill of rights” is used
in its modern sense.129 Thus it is clear from contemporary sources that “bill of
rights” did not have a fixed meaning, and that sometimes even the same writer can
use the term to refer to different provisions in different contexts.
When, after two days of debate, Bingham delivered the final speech on his
proposal, he once again referred to “the provisions in the bill of rights, that the
citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”130 Bingham also
made clear that he read an extra-textual right of equal protection into the “bill of
rights.” He referred to “the bill of rights that all shall be protected alike in life,
liberty and property” and twice later referred to “equal protection to life, liberty and
property” or “equal protection . . . in the rights of life, liberty and property” as
guaranteed by the existing “bill of rights.”131 Thus, although during this speech
Bingham repeatedly invoked “the bill of rights” or “this sacred bill of rights” or
“these provisions of the bill of rights,”132 he seemed clearly to include both the
Comity Clause and an extra-textual right of “equal protection” in life, liberty and
property in “the bill of rights.” He never made it entirely clear whether he included
all of the first eight (or ten) amendments.
Those who argue that Bingham understood his proposal to make the Bill of
Rights (in the modern sense) applicable to the states point to a passage in this
speech where Bingham observed that in Barron v. Baltimore and its progeny, the
Supreme Court had repeatedly held that the first ten amendments “are not
applicable to and do not bind the states.”133 But those amendments, Bingham
insisted, “are nevertheless to be enforced and observed in States by the grand
utterance of that immortal man, who, while he lived, stood alone in intellectual
power among the living men of his country, and now that he is dead, sleeps alone
in his honored tomb by the sounding sea.”134 Bingham then quoted at length from
the “grand argument” of the “immortal” Daniel Webster to the effect that the
Constitution was created by the people, not the states, that it imposes “injunctions
and prohibitions” on the states, and that state legislators are required to swear to
support it.135 These oaths were disregarded in the former slave states, Bingham
concluded, and the “whole question” was “simply, whether you will give by this
amendment to the people of the United States the power, by legislative enactment,
to punish officials of States for violation of the oaths enjoined upon them by their
129. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1064 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Hale); THOMAS
M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OFTHE AMERICAN UNION 256 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 144
(New York, Hurd & Houghton 1868). As discussed below, Bingham clearly used the term bill of rights
in the modern sense in an 1871 speech. See infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
130. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
131. Id. at 1089.
132. Id. at 1089-90.
133. Id. (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833), and Lessee of Livingston v.
Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833)).
134. Id. at 1090.
135. Id.
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Constitution?”136
What is one to make of this convoluted argument? It may well be that
Bingham believed that, despite Barron, the personal rights guaranteed in the first
eight amendments were binding on the states, although the federal government had
no power to enforce them. And it seems likely that Bingham intended something
like the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to be made
applicable to the states, although the text of his proposal did not yet contain the
words “due process.” Those who cite this speech as proof that Bingham intended
to make all the personal guarantees of the first eight amendments enforceable
against the states tend to argue that Bingham regarded them as included in (or
coextensive with) the “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.”
But if that is true, Bingham did not make himself clear, and based on the debates, it
does not seem that his colleagues understood him. Nor did Bingham explain why
the guarantees of the first eight amendments, which generally protect the rights of
all persons against violation by the federal government, should be extended only to
citizens in the case of violation by the states. In any case, Bingham failed to
convince not only Democrats, but also moderate Republicans, and was forced to
agree to the tabling of his proposal.137
After the failure of the Bingham Amendment in February, the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction again took up the task of drafting a constitutional amendment.
On April 21, Thaddeus Stevens introduced in the Committee a five-part proposal
drafted by the abolitionist and utopian socialist Robert Dale Owen,138 the first part
of which declared that “[n]o discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color or previous
condition of servitude.”139 Later that day Bingham proposed to add the language
that eventually became the second sentence of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person
140
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

In a puzzling series of votes over the course of the next week, this language
was first approved, then removed and also rejected as a free-standing proposal, then
adopted in place of the language originally proposed by Stevens.141
Stevens and most other participants in the debates seemed to understand this
language primarily as an antidiscrimination provision tracking the Civil Rights Act

136. Id.
137. See MALTZ, supra note 3, at 59-60.
138. For fuller discussion of Owen’s proposal, see GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 196-204
(2006).
139. KENDRICK, supra note 119, at 83.
140. Id. at 87.
141. See id. at 87, 98, 101, 106. Because the Journal of the Joint Committee records only the texts of
the various proposals and the votes on them, but not the actual debates, one can only speculate as to the
reason for these moves.
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of 1866.142 But Bingham evinced a much more idiosyncratic understanding.
According to Bingham, the Amendment was needed to empower Congress “to
protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the
Republic and the inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the
same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”143
What were these privileges and immunities? Perplexingly, Bingham stated that the
elective franchise is “one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic,” but “is
exclusively under the control of the States,” so long as they do not violate the
Article IV guarantee of a republican form of government.144 He suggested that the
Amendment would enable Congress to furnish a remedy for state infliction of
“cruel and unusual punishments.”145 And he maintained that the original Comity
Clause of Article IV protected, among other privileges, “the right to bear true
allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to be protected in
life, liberty, and property.”146 We have here an indication, then, that Bingham
regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating against the states at least
some of the protections of the first eight amendments (notably the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause). But he did not clearly indicate that all these
amendments were incorporated, and his enumeration of covered rights included
some derived from other constitutional provisions (the Republican Guarantee
Clause) and others not clearly spelled out in the constitutional text (the right of
protection by the government, the right “to bear true allegiance to the
Constitution”). He still did not make a clear distinction here between the Comity
Clause’s “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States” and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.” Rather, he continued confusingly to conflate the two.
Although Bingham’s statements during the 1866 debates often seem vague and
ambiguous, some of his later statements referred more clearly to incorporation. In
1867, during a debate on a bill to prohibit flogging, he alluded to the Barron
doctrine, under which the “personal rights” in “the first ten articles of amendment”
(such as the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment) limited Congress only, but could
not be enforced by Congress against the states.147 Bingham indicated that the
Fourteenth Amendment, once ratified, would change this situation, making these
provisions binding on the states and empowering Congress to enforce them.148
Oddly, though, in this speech he cited only the Equal Protection Clause, not the

142. See supra note 87.
143. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2542.
144. Id. Bingham noted that because Section Two contemplated that the elective franchise might be
abridged (with a corresponding reduction in representation), the Amendment did not give Congress the
power of regulating it, but suggested that Congress might intervene in cases where the right to a
republican government was wholly subverted. See id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867).
148. See id.
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Privileges or Immunities Clause, as the vehicle for incorporation.149
However, in early 1871, Bingham presented a report on behalf of the House
Judiciary Committee that seems completely inconsistent with incorporation. This
report urged rejection of a petition by Victoria Woodhull calling for the federal
protection of women’s suffrage as a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United
States under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Committee could simply have taken
the position that Bingham and other proponents of the Amendment had taken in
1866, namely that the elective franchise is not one of the privileges or immunities
protected by Section One. Instead, the Committee went much further, stating that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause “does not, in the opinion of the committee,
refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those
privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article
4, section 2.”150
Yet just two months later, during the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Bill,
Bingham endorsed incorporation much more clearly than he had ever done
before.151 In those debates, Samuel Shellabarger defended the constitutionality of
provisions in the Klan Bill prohibiting private acts of terrorism by relying on the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which he evidently
understood as nationalizing the natural or inherent rights protected by the Comity
Clause as explicated in Corfield v. Coryell.152 John Farnsworth did not dispute
Shellabarger’s basic reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but argued that
the bill went beyond Congress’ enforcement power because it reached purely
private action.153
In response to Farnsworth, Bingham defended the constitutionality of the Bill,
149. See id. Bryan Wildenthal has maintained that this 1867 speech indicates “with crystal clarity”
Bingham’s “goal of incorporating the first eight amendments.” Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the
Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68
OHIO ST. L.J., 1509, 1599 & n.295 (2007). Wildenthal criticizes my earlier work for “erroneously
claiming that Bingham never clearly stated, during 1866-68, the goal of incorporating the first eight
amendments.” Id. at n.295 (citing Boyce, supra note 25, at 1006-07). The exact words used in the
passage to which Wildenthal refers were “during the actual adoption of the Amendment” (not “during
1866-68), and in that passage I was summarizing the views of Charles Fairman, who correctly stated
during the debates in Congress in 1866 prior to Congress’ adoption of the Amendment, Bingham was
far from clear about total incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Boyce, supra note 25, at 1006-07 (citing
Fairman, supra note 123, at 136). In any case Bingham’s brief and somewhat cryptic 1867 statement,
made outside the context of the 1866 congressional debates over the adoption of the Amendment, with
its reference to the “first ten articles of amendment” (how exactly is the Tenth Amendment supposed to
be incorporated?) and to equal protection rather than privileges or immunities, is less than “crystal
clear.” As Wildenthal concedes, Bingham’s 1867 remarks “may have received little attention outside
Congress” and that “the evidence from the ratification struggle seems vague and scattered when it
comes to supporting any strong public awareness of nationalizing the entire Bill of Rights.” Wildenthal,
supra, at 1600 & n.295.
150. H.R. REP. NO. 41-22, at 1 (1871).
151. Kurt Lash has argued that the Woodhull Report may not represent Bingham’s own view of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Rather, Lash suggests, Bingham merely agreed “with the majority’s
bottom line” that the clause did not protect the elective franchise. Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29,
at 418.
152. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871).
153. See id. at app. 113-15. Eventually the House agreed to several amendments addressing Rep.
Farnsworth’s concerns and he voted in favor of the final version. See id. at 522.
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but he also rejected Shellabarger’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. For the first time, Bingham explained why he had abandoned the language
debated in February 1866 (“The Congress shall have power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to secure to citizens of each State all the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States”) in favor of the language
eventually adopted in June (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”). After the
struggle in February, Bingham explained, he reread the opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore,154 and “noted and apprehended as [he] never did
before, certain words in that opinion.”155 In Barron, Marshall stated that if the
framers had intended the first eight amendments to limit the states, they would have
inserted specific words to that effect, as the framers of the original Constitution had
done in prefacing the prohibitions of Article I, Section 10 with the words “No State
shall.”156 Therefore, Bingham explained, in his revised text of the Fourteenth
Amendment he began with those same words.157 Furthermore, Bingham explained
that “the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight
amendments to the Constitution of the United States,” which he then proceeded to
quote in full.158 Bingham insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment secures “other
and different privileges and immunities” than the Comity Clause of Article IV, as
construed by antebellum courts and commentators.159
Thus in this 1871 speech Bingham finally stated quite clearly (much more
clearly than he ever had during the framing and ratification in 1866-68) that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause served principally to
make the guarantees of the first eight amendments applicable to the states. At the
same time, Bingham’s new explanation suggests that his first proposal, which
exactly tracked the language of the Comity Clause, could not have been understood
to effect incorporation.
Was Bingham’s 1871 speech an accurate characterization of his views in 1866,
or was he simply trying to impose some coherence on his earlier inchoate
statements? James Garfield (the future President, who served as a Republican
Congressman from Ohio from 1863 to 1880) was skeptical. Garfield was present
throughout the debate in 1866 and had recently “read over, with scrupulous care,
every word of it as recorded in the Globe.”160 As he said to Bingham, “My
colleague can make but he cannot unmake history.”161 Moreover, as another
Republican, Horatio C. Burchard of Illinois, was quick to point out, by 1871
Bingham’s views on the Amendment had clearly shifted: he was now evidently
willing to support federal legislation reaching purely private conduct, an idea he

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
Barron, 32 U.S. at 248-49.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84 (1871).
Id.
Id.
Id. at app. 151.
Id.
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Burchard discussed three possible
had expressly repudiated in 1866.162
interpretations of the privileges or immunities clause: (1) that it protected a limited
set of rights, such as the rights protected in the Civil Rights Act of 1866; (2) that it
protected a broader set of rights as outlined in Corfield (Shellabarger’s position); or
(3) that it protected specifically those rights listed in the first eight amendments
(Bingham’s current claim).163 Of the three positions, Burchard noted, Bingham’s
current stance made the least sense as an argument in support of the Ku Klux Klan
bill, because the rights protected in the first eight amendments were not general
guarantees of “life and personal security” but merely “specific limitations, relating
to the mode of procedure or jurisdiction” in criminal cases.164 As this debate
shows, by 1871 a wide range of views still existed about the meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause among its Republican supporters.
Unlike many originalist incorporationist scholars, who have implausibly
argued that Bingham’s views were completely consistent throughout this period,
Lash admits that Bingham was inconsistent and argues that this inconsistency
“reflects a change of mind—an epiphany,”165 which led Bingham to abandon his
earlier draft tracking the language of the Comity Clause (“privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States”) in favor of the final version
(“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”). By this change of
language, Lash argues, Bingham sought to protect the personal rights listed in the
first eight amendments to the federal Constitution, but not “common law civil
rights” or “a broad range of unenumerated individual natural rights.”166
Unfortunately, Lash’s argument about Bingham’s “epiphany” does not
completely account for all of Bingham’s inconsistencies or for the extent to which
his constitutional theories were not fully thought out. Lash argues that Bingham
drew a “critical” distinction between the “natural rights of all persons” and the
particular “rights of United States citizens.”167 Thus, the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect the former, while the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects the latter. But Bingham did not always consistently adhere to this
distinction. For example, in his final speech of February 28, 1866 on his first
proposal, he referred to the right of equal protection in life, liberty and property
both as a right of “persons” and a right of “citizens.”168 Moreover, with the

162. See id. at app. 315.
163. See id. at app. 314.
164. Id.
165. Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 336.
166. Id. at 432.
167. Id. at 347.
168. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866). In this speech Bingham refers to the right
of “all persons, whether citizens or strangers” to “equal protection . . . in the rights of life and liberty and
property,” but then in the very next paragraph to “the citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property.” Id.
(emphasis added). He then again refers to the rights of “all persons . . . to equal protection in the rights
of life, liberty, and property,” before reverting to the statement that no state “has any right to deny
protection to any free citizen of the United States . . . in the rights of life, liberty, and property.” Id.
(emphasis added). There is not necessarily any logical inconsistency here, as citizens are of course
persons, but there is a terminological inconsistency, making Bingham’s distinction between the rights of
citizens and persons hard to follow.
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possible exception of the Second Amendment,169 the first eight amendments do
protect the rights of all persons, not just citizens: the word “person” or “people”
occurs in the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, while the word “citizen”
does not appear there at all. If Bingham understood the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to make the rights in the first eight amendments applicable against the
states, he never explained why those rights should protect all “persons” against the
federal government, but should protect only “citizens” against the states.170
Bingham also maintained throughout the debates that “the franchise of a
Federal elective office is as clearly one of the privileges of a citizen of the United
States as is the elective franchise for choosing Representatives in Congress or
presidential electors. They are both provided for and guarantied in your
Constitution.”171 But he insisted that even under the Fourteenth Amendment “the
exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of
the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States.”172 Bingham had in
fact opposed the Civil Rights Bill as “oppressive” and “unjust” because it
prohibited “discrimination in civil rights,” which he insisted included the elective
franchise, and he attacked its proponents for claiming the franchise was not
included.173 Yet he engaged in similar inconsistency himself with respect to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, by admitting that the elective franchise was a
privilege of national citizenship, yet denying that the Clause prohibited its
abridgement.
Lash recognizes that Bingham’s early invocations in the debates in February
1866 of the “bill of rights” referred not to the first eight amendments (as other
incorporationist scholars have maintained), but to the Comity Clause of Article IV
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.174 But he argues that this
“idiosyncratic view”175 would have mystified Bingham’s colleagues: “no one else,
in or outside Congress, appears to have shared Bingham’s view that Article IV was

169. The Second Amendment is anomalous because militia service was generally limited to a select
class of citizens only. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 14, at 65 (“[T]he right to keep and bear arms was
a civic right inextricably linked to the public responsibility to participate in a well-regulated militia.”);
AMAR, supra note 6, at 48 (arguing that at the time the Second Amendment was adopted, “the right to
bear arms had long been viewed as a political right, a right of First-Class Citizens,” analogous to the
right to vote, hold office, and serve on juries). However, Amar argues that by the time of
Reconstruction, arms bearing was no longer seen as a political right. See id. at 258-59. Even the
modern Supreme Court, in its recent decision recognizing a personal right to handguns for self-defense,
restricted the right as to “members of the political community” who are “law-abiding citizens.” District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580, 625, 644 (2008). But see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The
People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521,
1524 (2010) (arguing that the modern Court’s characterization of the right as a right to armed selfdefense is inconsistent with its restriction to citizens).
170. Indeed, as noted above, one of the reasons Bingham attacked the draft version of the Civil
Rights Bill was that it limited to “citizens” rights that belonged to all “persons.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866). See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
171. Id. at 2542.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1291.
174. See Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 355-58.
175. Id. at 355.
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part of the Bill of Rights.”176
Even more confusing than his shifting textual references to the “bill of rights”
were Bingham’s effusive statements regarding extra-textual privileges and
immunities. Lash argues that “Bingham’s focus on textually recognized rights
allowed him to avoid the undue expansion of federal power by carefully limiting
Congress’s enforcement power to those rights already expressly guaranteed in the
Constitution.”177 It is true that Bingham repeatedly claimed throughout the debates
that his proposed amendment imposed no new obligation “which is not now
enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution.”178 This might have
been a useful argument in convincing moderate or conservative Republicans who
were concerned about radical change. But Bingham’s claim was obviously not
true. Neither the language of Bingham’s amendment, nor his understanding of it,
simply recapitulated textually recognized rights.
The antebellum Constitution contained no equal protection provision.
Moreover, Bingham often equated the privileges and immunities of citizens with
natural rights, and in defining them did not limit himself to the constitutional text
but brought in a wide range of unenumerated rights. As early as 1859, in an
extensive argument that racially discriminatory provisions in the proposed Oregon
constitution violated the Comity Clause, Bingham said:
The equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to utter,
according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their toil, is the rock on
which that Constitution rests—its sure foundation and defense. . . . Before your
constitution, sir, as it is, as I trust it ever will be, all men are sacred, whether white
or black, rich or poor, strong or weak, wise or simple. Before its divine rule of
justice and equality of natural rights, Lazarus in his rags is as sacred as the rich
man clothed in purple and fine linen; the peasant in his hovel, as sacred as the
179
prince in his palace, or the king on his throne.

Bingham’s florid natural rights rhetoric and his willingness to read
unenumerated rights into the Constitution were at war with any claim that he
sought carefully to limit the Amendment to “those rights already expressly
guaranteed.”180
The crux of Lash’s argument is that by substituting for the language debated in
February 1866 (“privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states”) the
language debated in the House in April and ultimately adopted in the Fourteenth
Amendment (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”), Bingham
sought to make clear that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected not Comity
Clause rights as interpreted in cases like Corfield, but rather the rights protected by
the first eight amendments.181 As early as January 1866, Bingham indicated that he
viewed the Comity Clause as protecting rights of national rather than state
citizenship. He parsed its language as follows: “‘The citizens of each State (being
ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be entitled to all the privileges and
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 356.
Id. at 353.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859).
Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 353.
See id. at 351, 357-59, 397.
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immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis ‘of the United States’) in the several
States.’”182 In Lash’s view, Bingham’s first proposal used the exact language of the
Comity Clause, because under Bingham’s “ellipsis” theory, the Comity Clause
protected “the ‘privileges and immunities (of citizens of the United States) in the
several states’—a set of rights which Bingham insisted included only the Bill of
Rights.”183 The problem was, as the debates in February revealed, “Bingham’s
‘ellipsis’ theory of Article IV was so odd and idiosyncratic, it appears that no other
Republican followed his argument.”184 Instead, Bingham’s Republican colleagues
generally read the Comity Clause language through the traditional lens of the case
law as protecting an open-ended set of fundamental common law civil rights (as
specified in state law), such as the rights of property and contract.185 Lash argues
that while radical Republicans favored nationalizing the protection of all civil
rights, conservatives and moderates (including Bingham), whose votes were
needed for the two-thirds supermajority, rejected such an approach as an undue
extension of federal power.186
His colleagues’ incomprehension thus forced Bingham to withdraw his
original proposal, and, Lash argues, triggered an “epiphany” which led him to
abandon reliance on the Comity Clause and “to make a critical change in his
proposed constitutional text.”187 In the second draft, “Bingham abandoned the
language of Article IV and instead embraced the previously unstated ‘ellipsis.’”188
By the change in language, Lash argues, Bingham sought to ensure that his
Amendment would be understood as protecting the Bill of Rights.189 Thus Lash
accepts Bingham’s 1871 statements during the Ku Klux Klan Act debate—in
which Bingham tacitly conceded that his “original reading of Article IV was
incorrect,”190 and that the redrafted Privileges or Immunities Clause “protected a
completely different set of rights than those protected under Article IV,” namely
the rights guaranteed “in the first eight amendments to the Constitution”191—as an
accurate account of Bingham’s views during the debates in April and May of 1866,
after his supposed “epiphany” had taken place.192
The difficulty with this argument is that Bingham continued to conflate
references to the “bill of rights” with references to the Comity Clause right up to
very end of the debates in May, just as he had done earlier in February. In his very
last speech in the House on the Fourteenth Amendment, delivered minutes before
the final vote, just after complaining about state infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” Bingham invoked the Comity Clause:

182. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866).
183. Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 372.
184. Id. at 369.
185. See id. at 350-51, 358.
186. See id. at 358-68, 374-78.
187. Id. at 336.
188. Id. at 397.
189. See id. at 401.
190. Id. at 427.
191. Id. at 424.
192. See id. at 429 (“It is not as if scholars have dismissed this speech as post-adoption spin.”). In
fact, many have. See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 27, at 134-35, 144.
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Sir, the words of the Constitution that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States” include, among
other privileges, the right to bear true allegiance to the Constitution and the laws of
193
the United States, and to be protected in life, liberty, and property.

Bingham then quoted from the South Carolina Nullification Ordinance of
1833, which empowered the legislature to punish any citizen of the state who bore
allegiance to any government but the state’s.194 Unfortunately, he lamented,
Congress lacked the power to restrain South Carolina from punishing its own
citizens for bearing allegiance to the federal government, even though the
Ordinance clearly violated the Comity Clause.195 Fortunately, however, the
missing power “is supplied by the first section of this amendment.”196
These were Bingham’s final words on Section One before it was passed by the
House. If he had really undergone an “epiphany” that caused him to discard his
original reading of Article IV and abjure any equation between the privileges and
immunities of the Comity Clause and those protected in the Fourteenth
Amendment, why did he continue to focus on the Comity Clause in his very last
statement before the Amendment was adopted? Why did he continue to claim right
up to the very end of the debates that the Fourteenth Amendment would empower
Congress to enforce Comity Clause rights?
Moreover, speaker after speaker in the House had stated that Section One
merely constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act, a position perfectly consistent with
the view that the Comity Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, with their
very similar language, referred to the same set of basic rights. If Bingham truly
believed in April and May of 1866, as Lash contends, that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause “protected a completely different set of rights” than the Comity
Clause, is it really plausible that he would not only fail to correct his colleagues,
but that he would himself rely on the Comity Clause in his final defense of Section
One?
Lash struggles valiantly to make sense of Bingham and has contributed much
to our understanding of the complex evolution of his thought. He rightly rejects the
efforts of other incorporationist originalists to impose a Procrustean consistency on
Bingham’s idiosyncratic statements.197 But his “epiphany” hypothesis is ultimately
193. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
194. See id.
195. See id. at 2542-43.
196. Id. at 2543.
197. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103
YALE L.J. 57, 69, 74 (1993) (claiming that “Bingham consistently espoused a cogent theory of the
content of protected privileges and immunities,” and that “Bingham’s views . . . were not
idiosyncratic”). Bryan Wildenthal suggests that one should not criticize an important politician such as
Bingham for inconsistency: “Important historical actors . . . make sense to those around them; that is
why they are important actors. The historian’s task is to bring out their sense, not to denounce them as
fools.” Wildenthal, supra note 149, at 1539 (quoting Michael Zuckert, Book Review, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 149, 161 (1991)). But in Wildenthal’s reading, almost any statement by proponents about
the meaning of Section One supports incorporation. If proponents stated, as many did, that it simply
constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act, that supports incorporation, because “the Civil Rights Act itself
was widely understood to substantively protect Bill of Rights guarantees.” Id. at 1576 n.223. If
proponents (such as Senator Luke Poland) stated that it did not go beyond the Comity Clause of Article
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unconvincing. By 1871, well after ratification, Bingham was quite clear that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause protected all the rights in the first eight
amendments and did not refer to the same rights as the Comity Clause. However,
up to the very moment that the House passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866
he was much more ambiguous. He repeatedly invoked the “bill of rights” and even
specific textual guarantees found in the first eight amendments, such as the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Yet he also invoked in his
references to the “bill of rights” or “privileges and immunities” textual guarantees
outside the first eight amendments, such as the Comity Clause, the elective
franchise (although paradoxically he did not regard it is protected by Section One),
as well as extra-textual rights, including equal protection, “the right to bear true
allegiance” to the national government, and perhaps also “the right to live,” the
“right to know,” “the right to work and enjoy the product of their toil.”198
Lash argues that the required two-thirds majorities of both houses of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress would not support an amendment that was understood to
protect citizens against discrimination by their own states in the fundamental
common law rights that were the focus of the Comity Clause.199 Yet Congress had
done just that by statute in the Civil Rights Act, enacting it by supermajorities and
overriding President Johnson’s veto. Bingham, of course, voted against the Civil
Rights Act, but that merely demonstrates just how conservative and how isolated
among his Republican colleagues he was. Invocation of the “bill of rights” may
have been a powerful rhetorical tool in the debates, but the main concern expressed
by Republicans who supported the Amendment was the discrimination in state law
civil rights of property, contract, mobility, right to work, personal safety, and
access to the courts—the very rights that the Comity Clause had protected
interjurisdictionally, and that the Civil Rights Act protected intrajurisdictionally. It
seems only natural that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause would have been widely understood as prohibiting states from engaging in
racial discrimination with respect to these same rights, which is exactly the
understanding of the clause that many participants in the 1866 debates expressed.200
The third and final article in Lash’s series focuses on the 1866 election
campaign as the key to the original public meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.201 The debates in Congress provide confusing and often contradictory
evidence of the Amendment’s original meaning, and the scanty or nonexistent
records of the ratification debates in the state legislatures offer little clarification.202

IV, “more than likely” that supports incorporation, under the “view that the Bill of Rights was properly
understood to apply to the states even before the Civil War—a view based largely on their unorthodox
reading of the Article IV Clause.” Id. at 1569.
198. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
199. See Lash, Origins Part II, supra note 29, at 358-363.
200. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
201. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1281.
202. See id. at 1278 (discussing the “‘sounds of silence’ in the state ratifying conventions [sic]” and
observing that “there is little we can glean from ratification assemblies in the states, and those
assemblies themselves seem to lack the same kind of popular legitimacy as those that met at the time of
the founding.”) See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 145 (1986) (“Most of the state legislatures that considered the
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The solution to this conundrum, Lash argues, is to look at the election for evidence
of the original meaning. Lash starts with historian Eric Foner’s statement that
“[m]ore than anything else, the election became a referendum on the Fourteenth
Amendment.”203
Foner’s own discussion of the debates in Congress, the state legislatures, and
the electoral campaign, however, suggests that the search for a precise “original
meaning” of Section One may be misguided. Foner explains that, in Congress,
“compared with the now-forgotten disqualification and representation clauses, the
first section inspired relatively little discussion.”204 Moreover,
Republicans did not deny one Democrat’s description of the Amendment as “open
to ambiguity and . . . conflicting constructions” . . . On the precise definition of
equality before the law, Republicans differed among themselves. Even moderates,
however, understood Reconstruction as a dynamic process, in which phrases like
“privileges and immunities” were subject to changing interpretation. They
preferred to allow both Congress and the federal courts maximum flexibility in
205
implementing the Amendment’s provisions . . . .

Likewise, in Foner’s account, debates over the Fourteenth Amendment during the
election of 1866 focused largely on the representation and disqualification
clauses.206
Lash’s own account of these public debates does not clearly show that the
main focus was on protection of rights constitutionally enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. In the summer of 1866, he observes, Republican advocates of the
Fourteenth Amendment “dealt in vague generalities.”207 Many “expressly tied
Section I . . . to the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”208 Republicans generally “avoided
specifics in regard to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, preferring instead to
stress the general rights of due process and equality under law.”209
Lash’s main evidence regarding the original public meaning of Section One
during ratification focuses on the reactions to the police-led riots in Memphis in
May and in New Orleans in July 1866, in which dozens of blacks, unionists and
Republicans were massacred.210 Lash argues that during the months leading up to
the election, and in its immediate aftermath, many loyalists and Republicans
viewed these events as abridgements of the rights of free speech and assembly,
demonstrating the need for ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.211 After the
crushing Republican electoral victory, President Johnson proposed an alternate
version of the Fourteenth Amendment that would have retained the Citizenship,

Fourteenth Amendment either kept no record of their debates, or their discussion was so perfunctory that
it shed little light on their understanding of its meaning.”).
203. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1276 n.2 (quoting ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 267 (1st ed. 1988).
204. FONER, supra note 203, at 257.
205. Id. at 257-58.
206. See id. at 268-70.
207. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1304.
208. Id. at 1305.
209. Id. at 1307.
210. See id. at 1307-13.
211. See id. at 1313-27.
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Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, but would have replaced the clause
protecting the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States” with a
simple restatement of the language of Article IV’s Comity Clause.212 This counteramendment and the Republicans’ rejection of it demonstrate, in Lash’s view, that
both sides understood the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause as protecting enumerated constitutional rights but not unenumerated natural
rights.213
Unfortunately, the implications of this history are far more ambiguous than
Lash maintains. The police-led massacres in Memphis and New Orleans were not
examples of the states “making” or “enforcing” laws abridging the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States. They were not, in fact, based on any
legal authority, and are thus better understood as deprivations of life, liberty and
property without due process of law and gross breaches of the duty to provide equal
protection of the law. Therefore, Republican arguments that adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment was needed to prevent such abuses do not tell us much
about the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
It is true that Republicans referred to the freedom of speech, press, and
assembly in discussing these events. But those rights were understood as natural
rights and not just rights enumerated in the First Amendment. There is little
evidence that the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to protect non-natural rights enumerated in the Constitution,
such as the criminal and civil procedural protections found in the Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Amendments. If the Fourteenth Amendment had been widely understood
to make all of the guarantees of the first eight amendments of the federal
Constitution applicable to the states, one would certainly have expected discussion
of that fact, especially when it would have required changes in existing practices in
criminal and civil procedure. Yet, at the time the Amendment was adopted, many
states did not require indictment by grand jury, or trial by petit jury in all criminal
prosecutions or in all civil actions at common law where the amount in controversy
exceeded twenty dollars.214 The nineteenth-century trend in the states toward
abolition not only of the grand jury, but also of the privilege against selfincrimination, was unaffected by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.215
As one scholar has observed, if the Amendment had been widely understood to
make such provisions of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Amendments applicable to
the states, one would expect “that the issue would have been discussed”; yet “[t]he
historical record contains only silence.”216
At the same time, no one seems to have argued that the Fourteenth

212. Id. at 1327-29.
213. See id. at 1328-29.
214. See Charles Fairman, supra note 123, at 82-132.
215. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First) Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469, 478-500 (2009).
216. George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of
Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 153 (2001). Indeed, as Thomas observes,
during the decade after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, “five states . . . took action to modify
or eliminate their grand jury requirements.” George C. Thomas III, The Riddle of the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Response to Professor Wildenthal, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1627, 1654 (2007).
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Amendment did not protect natural rights not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution. Against the background of public discussions largely identifying the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act, and the broad natural rights
rhetoric often deployed by Bingham and many others, this fact seems critical. Of
course, Lash argues that the change in language from Bingham’s first draft, which
tracks the language of the Comity Clause (“privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several states”) to his second draft (“privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States”) was meant to exclude unenumerated rights. Yet he also argues that
the privileges or immunities protected in the final version include Comity Clause
rights. The final draft thus seems broader, not narrower, than the initial one. If the
language of the first version could be understood to protect unenumerated natural
rights, why not also the language of the final version? If unenumerated natural
rights were excluded, surely we would expect clearer discussion of that fact.
Finally, Lash cites President Johnson’s statements as proof that all sides
understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause as referring exclusively to
enumerated constitutional rights. When Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Act of
1866, he asked: “Can it be reasonably supposed that [the freed slaves] possess the
requisite qualifications to entitle them to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States?”217 As Lash observes, this is the first appearance in
the 1866 debates of the phrase “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States,” which would later become part of the Fourteenth Amendment.218 But
Johnson did not make clear what he meant by that phrase. He did not connect it in
any way with the Bill of Rights, which, after all, protects the rights of all persons,
not just citizens. The phrase “Citizen of the United States” in the antebellum
Constitution occurs only in reference to the qualifications for federal office.219
Johnson’s fears seemed to center on the potential exercise of civic rights by blacks,
such as the elective franchise and the franchise of office, because he complained
about “discrimination against large numbers of intelligent, worthy and patriotic
foreigners, and in favor of the negro” when the latter is “less informed as to the
nature and character of our institutions.”220
In early 1867 Johnson proposed an alternative to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Johnson’s counterproposal, as Lash puts it, “erased the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and replaced it with a passive restatement of Article IV’s Comity Clause,”
while retaining the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment .221 Lash claims that this episode proves that Johnson understood the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting enumerated rights only. But it does
not show how Johnson understood the Clause, much less that a common
understanding of the Clause existed. Johnson could have rejected the Clause
because he saw it as protecting unenumerated natural rights, enumerated rights, or
some combination thereof. Andrew Johnson may well have opposed it for the
same reason that Reverdy Johnson opposed it in the Senate: “simply because I do
217. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866).
218. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1290 (emphasis omitted).
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives); art. I, §3, cl. 3 (Senators); art. II, §1, cl. 5
(President).
220. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866).
221. Lash, Origins Part III, supra note 30, at 1328.
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not understand what will be the effect of that.”222 It is entirely probable that he had
no very clear theory of its meaning, but opposed it because he saw it as somehow
embodying the Republican and Radical principles of his enemies.
B. ABSTRACT ORIGINALISM
1. Calabresi: A Conservative Fourteenth Amendment
Recently, Steven Calabresi and Julia Rickert have questioned the prevailing
judicial and scholarly consensus that originalism cannot justify the current
constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination.223 Their argument proceeds as
follows. “[O]riginalists ought to begin and end all analysis with the original public
meaning of constitutional texts.”224 However, they maintain that this does not
require us to determine what the enacting Congress thought the text meant; indeed,
“Congress often enacts texts into law without understanding what those texts
mean” and has “great incentives to legislate ambiguously in order to please most of
the people, most of the time.”225 Nevertheless, relying on a few selected statements
of the framers, ratifiers, and early interpreters, Calabresi and Rickert conclude that
“the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it bans all
systems of caste and of class-based lawmaking.”226 While they concede that the
framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not generally recognize sex
discrimination as a form of caste, they insist that “[t]he question of whether sex
discrimination was (or was not) a form of caste was purely a question of fact,”227
and observe that some nineteenth-century feminist writers did analogize between
the two.228 Finally, they argue that the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment
resolved the factual question that the Fourteenth Amendment (in their view) left
open. Once the Nineteenth Amendment gave “women the right to vote it became
implausible to read the no-caste rule of the Fourteenth Amendment as allowing
discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to civil rights.”229 Thus, “the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment permanently changed the way in which the
Fourteenth Amendment ought to be read.”230 The authors conclude that “[t]he
original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, when read in light of the
Nineteenth Amendment, renders sex discrimination as to civil rights
unconstitutional.”231
Almost every move in this argument is highly questionable. If originalist
argument must begin and end with the original public meaning of constitutional
222. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3041 (1866).
223. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 2-3; see also Ward Farnsworth, Women Under
Reconstruction: The Congressional Understanding, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2000) (providing a
detailed argument that the Court’s modern sex discrimination jurisprudence is “not strictly originalist”).
224. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 4.
225. Id. at 7.
226. Id. at 11.
227. Id. at 14.
228. See id. at 57-60.
229. Id. at 67.
230. Id. at 15.
231. Id. at 101.
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texts, it is curious that Calabresi and Rickert are unwilling to state precisely which
text forms the basis of the anticaste principle. As they note, the text does not use
the terms “caste” or “class discrimination,” and the framers “were, for the most
part, vexingly silent on the independent operation of Section One’s clauses.”232
The prohibition of caste and class legislation, they argue, might be found in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, or the Equal Protection Clause, or some
combination of the two.233 The historical record is unclear, and they are unwilling
to commit to a specific answer. Indeed, they are remarkably insouciant about the
specific public meaning of individual clauses: “Fortunately, settling which clause
or combination of clauses the Framers and contemporary readers of Section One
understood to prohibit unequal legislation is not necessary to our argument.”234
Yet if the text itself is not specifically framed in terms of an anticaste principle,
and the understanding of the enacting Congress is not dispositive because Congress
often does not understand what it is doing, how do we know that the original public
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it bans all systems of caste and of
class-based lawmaking? Calabresi and Rickert cite various statements by
proponents of the Amendment, most notably Senator Howard, that it would do
away with caste and class legislation.235 But of course, a fuller account of the
legislative history would disclose many other possible understandings of the
Amendment’s main provisions. As discussed above, many proponents of Section
One argued that it simply recapitulated the protections of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.236 Much of the framers’ discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
seems to focus, as Hamburger has argued, on Comity Clause rights.237 Much of the
discussion of the Equal Protection Clause is consistent, as Christopher Green has
argued, with a narrow focus on the purely protective functions of government,
rather than a broad prohibition of all types of discriminatory legislation.238
Calabresi and Rickert do not attempt a detailed justification of their selection of a
handful of particular statements from the legislative history as establishing the
original public meaning. Indeed, if, as they claim, “it is the public understanding of
the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment that establishes its original public
meaning,”239 the paucity of references to the anticaste principle during ratification
would seem to be a devastating difficulty. They cite very few specific references to
such a principle during ratification, and concede that “it is impossible to know how
often the Amendment’s anticaste rule was discussed in state legislatures or how
many legislators were consciously aware of its existence.”240
While embracing Senator Howard’s statement that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits caste and class legislation as an authoritative exposition of its original
public meaning, Calabresi and Rickert simply dismiss or ignore the statements of
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 20.
See id. at 20-24.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 34-35.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See Hamburger, supra note 27, at 62-68.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 36.
Id. at 40.
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leading proponents, such as Howard, Stevens, Bingham, and many others, that it
would not require equal treatment of women as irrelevant to the Amendment’s
meaning.241 They freely concede that the Amendment’s congressional proponents
almost universally maintained that it did not require gender equality.242 But they
insist that this fact is relevant only to the expected application of the anticaste
principle and not to its meaning.243
Calabresi and Rickert never adequately justify this critical move. Arguably,
the framers’ statements on gender establish that the original meaning of the
anticaste principle itself was narrower than the one they favor. As Jack Balkin has
put it, their approach “begs the question whether the adopters’ views and
statements of purpose and principle involve mistakes about facts, or actually
demonstrate disagreements with our present-day judgments about values. That
might be so because interpretive judgments often mingle factual and normative
premises together.”244
Calabresi and Rickert’s insistence that the framers’ discussions of gender
equality may be disregarded because they are irrelevant to original meaning is
arbitrary and unsupported. Indeed, all scholars of the Fourteenth Amendment are
in agreement that Section One was principally designed to prohibit certain forms of
racial discrimination. How do we know this, when Section One does not mention
the word “race”? Because the legislative history makes clear that this was the
principal intended application. Yet on what grounds can we accept evidence of
expected applications indicating that race was covered and yet reject it when it
indicates that gender was not covered?
Calabresi and Rickert’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a ban
on caste and class legislation raises vast problems that they do not adequately
explore. They claim that “[c]lass legislation and caste were often used
interchangeably by those who contemplated the Fourteenth Amendment.”245 In
fact, their own evidence shows that while the terms were often used together, they
were not interchangeable. Dictionary definitions and other contemporary sources
clearly establish that in the nineteenth century (as today) the primary meaning of
“caste” referred to the Hindu caste system, but the word could also be applied to
orders of society, while the term “class” was much broader, potentially referring to
any social division or grouping.246
Calabresi and Rickert prefer to focus on caste, the narrower of the two terms.
Astonishingly, they claim that “[l]ooking first to the original caste system, that of
India, we find that in its earliest sense, the term caste was an apt description of the
status of women.”247 This is flatly incorrect, and they concede that “[s]ex and caste

241. See id. at 51-55; cf. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (statement of Rep. Bingham
dismissing concerns about restrictions on married women’s property rights).
242. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 51.
243. Id. at 52.
244. Jack M. Balkin, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, or, How Thick is Original Public
Meaning?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 8, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/12/originalism-and-sexdiscrimination-or.html.
245. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 17 n.72.
246. See id.
247. Id. at 57.
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were not identical.”248 The term “caste” has a very specific historical content. It
refers to hereditary social divisions in Hindu society characterized by endogamy,
commensality, and craft-exclusiveness.249 Such a term could easily be extended to
race in American society, but is rather more difficult to extend to gender, except in
the most metaphorical sense. Race was hereditary in that the offspring of blacks
were considered black; gender is not hereditary in the same sense, in that the
offspring of women are not necessarily women.
Racial endogamy and
commensality were also enforced through miscegenation and segregation laws; the
opposite was the case with gender. “Caste” might be readily analogized to the
modern constitutional concept of “discrete and insular minorities,”250 while, as has
often been observed, women are neither insular nor a minority. Certainly, one may
draw analogies between caste and gender, or between race and gender, as
nineteenth-century feminists often did. Indeed, Calabresi and Rickert cite one
nineteenth-century feminist who wrote of the “caste of sex,” stating that “[m]en are
the Brahmins, women the Pariahs, under our existing civilization.”251 But it is not
clear that these references are more than an analogy or a metaphor. Gender
discrimination is like caste discrimination or race discrimination in certain respects
(particularly in confining women to certain roles and occupations), but that is not
the same as saying that gender discrimination is caste discrimination.
If the term “caste” is arguably too narrow to comfortably include gender, the
term “class” is much broader. Calabresi and Rickert focus primarily on “caste,”
perhaps because the term “class” is too broad for their purposes. The term “class
legislation” as used in nineteenth-century legal discourse could refer to any specialinterest legislation.252 For the Jacksonian Democrats, who crystallized opposition
to class legislation, the creation of the Second Bank of the United States was the
paradigmatic case of class legislation.253 As embraced by nineteenth-century
courts, legal commentators and political actors of all stripes, “class legislation”
could refer to any law singling out an individual or group for special benefits
without adequately promoting the general welfare.254 The difficulty with such a
doctrine from a modern perspective, as Melissa Saunders has pointed out, is that it
is very difficult to distinguish laws improperly singling out groups for special
benefits from those that promote the general welfare: a broad prohibition of class
legislation in this nineteenth-century sense thus seems flatly incompatible with
“modern political theory’s teaching that the democratic process is nothing but a
struggle between competing interest groups.”255 Judicial enforcement of such a
broad principle would revolutionize constitutional law and empower courts to
invalidate almost any legislation, with unpredictable results. Unsurprisingly, while
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 58.
See R.K. PRUTHI, INDIAN CASTE SYSTEM 76 (2004).
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 59-60 (quoting MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, PRECEDING
CAUSES (1881), reprinted in THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMEN SUFFRAGE 51, 52 (Mari Jo Buhle &
Paul Buhle eds., 2005).
252. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 245, 251-68 (1997).
253. See id. at 257.
254. See id. at 260-61.
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Calabresi and Rickert do not exactly repudiate this principle, they do not embrace it
either.256 Yet surely, if the central meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it
bans caste or class legislation, its potentially unlimited sweep is a serious problem
that they ought to have addressed.
Finally, it is unclear why, from an originalist perspective, the adoption of the
Nineteenth Amendment alters the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to
sex discrimination.257 The Nineteenth Amendment prohibits sex discrimination
with respect to the right to vote. Calabresi and Rickert argue that it is irrational to
prohibit sex discrimination in political rights, but not in ordinary civil rights.258
Yet from an originalist perspective, it is not clear why unconstitutionality follows
from irrationality. The framers of the Nineteenth Amendment knew that the
Supreme Court had declined to read the Fourteenth Amendment as a general
prohibition of sex discrimination, yet they failed to enact such a general
prohibition.
Anticipating this objection, Calabresi and Rickert argue that the Court had
never specifically held that the Fourteenth Amendment permitted sex
discrimination,259 suggesting perhaps that a broader subsequent constitutional
prohibition of sex discrimination was unnecessary. However, as they recognize,
the Court was squarely presented in Bradwell v. Illinois260 with the argument that
sex discrimination violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and chose to ignore it. In
Bradwell, the majority, following Slaughter-House, rejected Myra Bradwell’s
claim for admission to the bar on the ground that the practice of law was not one of
the privileges or immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.261 Yet
Justice Bradley, who had dissented in Slaughter-House, urging a broad scope for
the Fourteenth Amendment much more in line with modern originalist views,262 did
specifically hold that it permitted sex discrimination.263 Bradley denied that “it is
one of the privileges and immunities of women as citizens to engage in any and
every profession, occupation, or employment in civil life.”264 Rather, “[t]he
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.”265 In light of this and similar
decisions, the need for a constitutional amendment to prohibit sex discrimination
generally was clear.
The Nineteenth Amendment, however, only addressed women’s suffrage, not
256. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 18 n.73 (noting that the authors’ argument that the
Fourteenth “Amendment bans caste does not preclude understanding the Amendment also to ban class
legislation as described by Professor Saunders, although, her claim is in some respects a more ambitious
one.”).
257. See generally Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 269
(2012).
258. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 70-85.
259. See id. at 60-66.
260. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 135-36 (1873).
261. Id. at 139.
262. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 44 (stating that Bradley’s dissent was “more in
touch with the original meaning”).
263. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring in judgment).
264. Id. at 140.
265. Id. at 141.
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women’s rights generally. That was the most that was politically feasible at the
time. Its own proponents did not understand it to prohibit sex discrimination
generally, and began almost immediately to campaign for a broader provision in
the form of the Equal Rights Amendment.266 It is certainly true that supporters of
the Nineteenth Amendment sought full equality for women and sought to build on
the legacy of the Reconstruction Amendments, but as Calabresi and Rickert
concede, “the very people responsible for guaranteeing women the vote did not
think that the Constitution prohibited sex discrimination as to civil rights.”267
Calabresi and Rickert claim simply to be “following Justice Scalia’s
methodology completely”268 with regard to ascertainment of the original public
meaning of the Constitution. Yet they argue that the proper application of this
methodology leads to the conclusion that Justice Ginsburg was right and Justice
Scalia was wrong in the VMI case, the Court’s most important recent decision on
sex discrimination.269 Justice Scalia would certainly be surprised by Calabresi and
Rickert’s claim that they are following his methodology. Scalia’s approach to
originalism is fundamentally static. It accords primacy to “those constant and
unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s understanding of ambiguous
constitutional texts.”270 Thus, under Scalia’s approach, if there is an unbroken
tradition of state-supported single sex education, it cannot violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. After all, the Amendment’s text is ambiguous in that it completely
fails to specify exactly which forms of discrimination are prohibited.
Calabresi and Rickert disagree with Justice Scalia, but they also crucially
disagree with each other on the application of this ambiguous constitutional text.
Indeed, Calabresi’s approach is only slightly less static than Scalia’s. For
Calabresi, the Nineteenth Amendment is critical to the recognition of sex
discrimination as a form of caste, and therefore only race and sex discrimination
are prohibited.271 Rickert would allow the courts to recognize other forms of caste
discrimination.272

266. See KATHARINE H. ADAMS & MICHAEL L. KEENE, ALICE PAUL AND THE AMERICAN SUFFRAGE
CAMPAIGN xv (2008).
267. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 67 n.314. See also Ed Whelan, Critique of Calabresi’s
“Originalism and Sex Discrimination”—Part 3, BENCH MEMOS (Nov. 30, 2011, 12:04 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/284466/critique-calabresi-s-originalism-and-sexdiscrimination-part-3-ed-whelan (arguing that it is much more plausible from an originalist perspective
to understand the Nineteenth Amendment as “ensur[ing] that the views of women, as one-half of the
voting populace, would be fully taken into account in the political processes and that those processes,
flawed as they inevitably are, would be the vehicle for working out which interests should be protected
as rights.”).
268. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at 4.
269. See id. at 96 (discussing United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
270. VMI, 518 U.S. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271. Calabresi is slightly coy in this regard, suggesting that a group qualifies as a caste “only” where
a constitutional amendment (such as the Nineteenth Amendment) singles them out for special
protection, but later in the same paragraph suggests merely that such an amendment “is almost a
prerequisite” for protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 33, at
97.
272. See id. As one commentator has observed, “[t]hat Calabresi and Rickert disagree on this
fundamental point (almost in passing) . . . deserves more scrutiny.” Blackman, supra note 257, at 281.
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In a second recent article (coauthored with Andrea Matthews),273 Calabresi
applies similar methods while purporting to deploy “Scalia-style originalism”274 to
defend the result in Loving v. Virginia,275 which struck down a ban on interracial
marriage. Again, this is a “Scalia-style originalism” that has little in common with
Scalia’s own presumption of constitutionality for longstanding practices not
unambiguously prohibited by the constitutional text. The authors insist that
“Scalia-style originalists . . . should reject the use of any legislative history as a tool
in . . . constitutional interpretation.”276 In practice, however, they do resort to
legislative history so long as it provides a predicate for their preferred
interpretation; they reject it only insofar as it demonstrates that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment rejected their conclusions.
The predicate for their analysis is the widely-accepted proposition that the
“Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”277 But
how do we know that this proposition is true? After all, the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment is quite different from the language of the Civil Rights Act.
We know that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to constitutionalize the
Civil Rights Act, as Calabresi and Matthews point out, because the framers of the
Amendment repeatedly said so.278 So much for the rejection of resort to legislative
history.
Now, Calabresi and Matthews would claim that they can establish this
meaning without resorting to legislative history. They examine the definitions of
“privilege” and “immunity” in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary and claim that both
definitions refer to “positive law rights and not natural law rights.”279 However, the
definitions quoted do not exactly say this (it is a gloss supplied by Calabresi and
Matthews), and even if they did, it is not clear how that would advance their case.
After all, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, which contemplates the
denial of voting rights for women and some men, makes perfectly clear that it does
not protect all positive law rights.
So which positive law rights were protected? According to Calabresi and
Matthews, the “conclusion is inescapable” that an “objective reader” would look to
the rights protected by Article IV, Section 2 to determine “the positive law
privileges or immunities of state citizenship.”280 But if resort to legislative history
is prohibited, it is hardly clear why such a conclusion is inescapable. First, the text
of the amendment refers to “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States,” not “privileges or immunities of state citizenship.” Why would an
objective reader, with no access to the legislative history, not read this as a
reference to a different set of rights than the Article IV privileges and immunities
of state citizenship, namely, to privileges or immunities of federal citizenship, as
273. Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 1393 (2012).
274. Id. at 1395.
275. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
276. Calabresi & Matthews, supra note 273, at 1395.
277. Id. at 1409.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 1416.
280. Id. at 1417.
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Kurt Lash, for example, has argued? On the other hand, even if Calabresi and
Matthews are right that an objective reader would identify the Fourteenth
Amendment’s privileges or immunities with Article IV’s privileges and
immunities, the latter were protections only against interstate discrimination, not
against discriminations by a state among its own citizens (this is Philip
Hamburger’s basic point). Calabresi and Matthews may well be right about the
likely original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities
Clause, but they simply cannot prove their point by consulting dictionaries and
engaging in jejune textual analysis without resort to the legislative history.
Having asserted that the Amendment constitutionalized the 1866 Act, the
authors then observe that the Act guaranteed to all citizens “the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”281 Now, “the right
to marry is just a subset of the right to make a particular form of contract”:282 ergo,
it was protected by the 1866 Act and hence the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
“[i]f a white citizen could contract to marry a white citizen, then according to the
plain words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 [and hence the Fourteenth
Amendment] African Americans must have the identical right.”283
The difficulty with this argument from an originalist perspective is that the
framers and supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly confronted it and
rejected it284 for two reasons. First, they typically insisted that marriage was a civil
right, not a social right, and hence not covered by the Civil Rights Act or the
Fourteenth Amendment.285 Second, they argued that a ban on interracial marriage
was not a form of discrimination, because it applied equally to blacks and whites
by forbidding them to marry outside their race.286
Nowadays we tend (rightly, in my view) to regard discrimination in marriage
rights as a violation of fundamental civil rights. Indeed, the argument that
Calabresi and Matthews make is identical in structure to a major argument for the
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage—that it discriminates on the basis of sex
because if a male citizen can marry a female citizen, a female citizen should have
the same right. However, the debates surrounding the framing and ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment suggest that its supporters understood its meaning more
narrowly, as protecting the right to engage in commercial contracts but not

281. Id. at 1410 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27).
282. Id. at 1412.
283. Id. at 1424-25.
284. See generally Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 1224 (1966).
285. For example, Rep. Samuel W. Moulton (R. Ill.) argued that the Freedman’s Bureau Bill’s
protection of “civil rights” did not include the rights to marry or to sit on juries. The right to marry,
according to Moulton, was a “social right,” not a “civil right,” although he confusingly also insisted that
“the right to marry is not strictly a right at all.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866).
286. This argument was made by supporters of the Civil Rights Act in response to objections by a
leading Democratic opponent, Reverdy Johnson (D. Md.), who made exactly the same arguments about
marriage that Calabresi and Matthews do. Supporters of the Civil Rights Act such as Senator Lyman
Trumbull insisted that miscegenation laws involved “no discrimination,” and Senator William P.
Fessenden (R. Me.) likewise argued that miscegenation laws did not discriminate, because a black man
had “the same right to make a contract of marriage with a white woman that a white man has with a
black woman.” Id. at 505.
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marriage, and as prohibiting asymmetrical but not symmetrical forms of
discrimination.
According to Calabresi and Matthews, “[i]ronically, the strongest arguments
for the equality of all contract rights, including rights to enter into marriage
contracts, is [sic] perhaps best articulated by the detractors of the Civil Rights
Act.”287 There is in fact nothing ironic about this. Democratic opponents of the
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment knew that they stood little chance of passage if
they were understood to outlaw bans on interracial marriage. Proponents of these
measures uniformly insisted that they would not have that effect. Calabresi and
Matthews insist that those proponents were wrong about that, adding that they “do
not know or care whether the framers of the Civil Rights Act were fools, knaves, or
crafty abolitionists.”288 But they seem to utterly discount the possibility that the
framers honestly characterized their own understanding of the meaning of the Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Calabresi’s originalist methodology undertakes a puzzling series of moves that
are very difficult to explain except as dictated by a predetermined political agenda.
He seeks to rescue for originalism those decisions that are now regarded as fixed
landmarks in the law, and whose repudiation would be an embarrassment, while
drawing the line at further developments. He is able to do so only by resorting to
arbitrary manipulation of interpretive levels of generality and a selective and
tendentious use of evidence including, where necessary, post-enactment evidence,
to achieve desired results.
2. Balkin: Living Originalism
In a provocative recent body of work, Jack Balkin has argued that “the debate
between originalism and living constitutionalism rests on a false dichotomy.”289
Like Calabresi and Barnett, Balkin insists that originalists are bound only by the
original meaning of the constitutional text, not the original expected applications of
those who adopted it.290 Balkin refers to his constitutional theory as “framework
originalism” and his theory of interpretation and construction as the “method of
text and principle.”291 Originalism mandates “[f]idelity to ‘original meaning,’” in
Balkin’s view, only in the sense of the “semantic content of the words” in the
constitutional text.292 But the text consists of provisions of varying levels of
abstraction: specific “rules,” broader “standards,” and even more general
“principles.”293 When the text states a specific rule, such as “the president must be
thirty-five,” it can be applied directly.294 However, when the text states a general
principle, such as “freedom of speech” or “equal protection,” those principles can
be implemented only through the articulation of “underlying” or “subsidiary”
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principles.295 Additional underlying principles, such as democracy, separation of
powers, and checks and balances may be derived from the text, structure, and
history of the Constitution as a whole, rather than from any particular provision.296
For Balkin, while originalism mandates fidelity to the original semantic
meaning of the rules, standards and principles in the constitutional text
(constitutional “interpretation-as-ascertainment”), it leaves to future generations the
articulation of underlying principles and doctrines needed to implement the text as
law (constitutional “interpretation-as-construction”).297 While these underlying
principles are not fixed and binding in the same sense as the text is, Balkin
nonetheless argues that we should look at history in constructing them298 and that
they should be articulated “at roughly the same level of generality as the text” that
they “support and explain.”299
Balkin contrasts his “framework originalism,” which understands the
Constitution as a framework for government that must be filled in through a
process of constitutional construction by the political branches, the judiciary, and
mobilized popular movements, with “skyscraper originalism,” which “views the
Constitution as more or less a finished project” that can be extended only through
constitutional amendment.300 It is construction, not interpretation-as-ascertainment,
that does most of the heavy lifting in Balkin’s “framework originalism,” and
construction is not limited to the approaches of the framers. Rather, subsequent
political and social movements play a critical role in constitutional construction,
invoking constitutional text and principles in new ways that transform their
practical meaning.301 Over time, this process holds out hope of redeeming the
Constitution’s promise of “a more perfect Union” as each generation adapts it to its
own needs and makes it its own.302 It is in this sense that Balkin’s approach is both
originalist and living constitutionalist.
By insisting that constitutional construction should draw on history in
articulating underlying principles, but only at roughly the same level of generality
as the text, and that it should not be bound by original expected applications,
Balkin erects a theory capacious enough to justify virtually any doctrine of modern
constitutional law. His theory privileges a highly abstract approach to the process
of constitutional interpretation of the most doctrinally important constitutional
clauses, which are themselves abstract texts. In practice, he relies on history for the
construction of constitutional doctrine, but is free to discard those portions of the
historical understanding that are ill-suited to modern purposes. As he describes it,
“[t]he difference between [his] framework originalism and conservative originalism
is the difference between viewing history as a resource and viewing it as a
command.”303
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Indeed, Balkin freely concedes that any resort to “original meaning” in legal
interpretation necessarily selects only a portion of the rich array of cultural
meanings of the text in its original historical setting and discards the rest.304 “There
is no natural and value-free way to make this selection.”305 Moreover, although
public-meaning originalism rejects reliance on the subjective intentions of the
framers and ratifiers, “interpretation of a legal text always involves an ascription of
purpose or intention to an author.”306 However, legal “practices of interpretation
are . . . always anachronistic and selective because we are interpreting for a
(present-day) purpose.”307
Given that Balkin is “a liberal defending the modern state,”308 it is not
surprising that for him this anachronistic and selective practice of interpretation
yields expansive grants of power to the federal government as well as expansive
protections for individual rights. In this comprehensive theory, his treatment of the
former (particularly the Commerce Clause) furnishes a crucial context for the latter
(including the Fourteenth Amendment). Balkin’s interpretation of the Commerce
Clause takes as its starting point the idea that “commerce” is “intercourse,” an
equation found not just in Gibbons v. Ogden,309 but also in Samuel Johnson’s
eighteenth-century dictionary.310
“Intercourse” included not just economic
transactions but “interactions, exchanges, interrelated activities, and movements
back and forth, including, for example, travel, social connection, or
conversation.”311 For Balkin, the “animating purpose” behind the list of
enumerated powers found in Article I, Section 8 is stated in the resolution
(Resolution VI) originally introduced by Edmund Randolph at the Philadelphia
Convention and later slightly reworded by Gunning Bedford: to grant Congress the
power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.”312
Thus, the Commerce Clause includes the power to regulate transactions with
foreign nations or affecting more than one state that “require a federal solution”
because leaving them to the individual states would produce “collective action
problems” or harmful “spillover effects.”313
Other originalists object that Balkin’s approach in effect substitutes the broad
extra-textual power to legislate for the “general interests of the Union” for the
narrower specific grants of power actually found in the constitutional text.314 It is
true that “commerce” can bear the meaning of “interaction,” and as Balkin
demonstrates, that meaning was substantially more common in the eighteenth
304. Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 815, 828.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 829.
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314. See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: The Virginia Plan and Authority to Resolve Collective
Action Problems Under Article 1, Section 8, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2123 (2012).
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century than it is today. Yet the primary meaning of the English word “commerce”
(like its Latin source “commercium”) has always referred to trade or exchanges of
merchandise (Latin “merx, mercis”). For the semantic originalist, in choosing
between the primary and secondary meanings, the question, according to Balkin, is
how the term “was generally and publicly used when the text was adopted.”315
Randy Barnett, surveying every use of the term in the Philadelphia convention, The
Federalist, and the ratification conventions, concluded that it was always used in
the sense of trade and not in any broader sense.316 In light of this evidence, Barnett
argues, the Bedford Resolution cannot alter the original semantic meaning of
“commerce” as “trade.”317 Balkin largely does not dispute Barnett’s evidence of
usage.318 But if Barnett is correct about the original semantic meaning of
“commerce,” it poses a devastating difficulty for Balkin’s entire liberal living
originalist theory.
As for the Fourteenth Amendment, Balkin, like other new originalists, relies
heavily on the exposition of Senator Howard introducing the Amendment to the
Senate.319 Balkin begins with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, “which the
framers . . . designed to be its central guarantor of civil rights and civil liberties.”320
This Clause, he argues, is a guarantee both of equality and substantive liberties, but
it is “declaratory—its language does not specify the rights it protects but merely
asserts their existence.”321 As Balkin explains:
It uses a common law method to identify rights . . . [and] thus relies on tradition,
but the tradition is often an invented tradition, or, at the very least, it is a tradition
selectively viewed and interpreted from the standpoint of the present. . . . It treats
tradition not as providing fixed rules but rather as offering legal and rhetorical
322
resources for making arguments about justice in the present.

The Clause thereby protects against state infringement of not only all textually
enumerated individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution (such as those in the
Bill of Rights), but also fundamental unenumerated rights.323 But given that there
is no general agreement on the scope of unenumerated rights, how are they to be
ascertained? Balkin suggests that “[o]ne way to do this—although not the only
315. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 46.
316. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001).
317. Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623,
644-48.
318. See Balkin, supra note 304, at 868. Balkin’s main riposte to Barnett is that Barnett’s theory
would leave Congress without any general powers to regulate foreign relations, interstate and
international communications or perhaps even navigation. See id. at 868-74. With regard to the latter,
Balkin argues that in order to reach navigation, Barnett’s “trade” theory of commerce requires us to
interpret “commerce” metonymically (or to resort to the necessary and proper clause). See id. at 869.
Balkin claims that his approach is preferable because “[i]f ‘commerce’ means ‘intercourse,’ . . . we do
not have to assume that the word was used nonliterally.” Id. But Balkin’s equation of commerce with
intercourse (in the broad sense of “interaction”) is a nonliteral or metonymic usage.
319. See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 192-93, 195-97, 220-21.
320. Id. at 191.
321. Id. at 199.
322. Id. at 199-200.
323. See id. at 200-19.
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way—is to look at the kinds of rights that have historically or traditionally been
protected by states, or rights that almost all of the states have recognized or
protected.”324 Thus, “[u]nenumerated rights will come and go over very long
periods of time” and even the scope of enumerated rights “will depend on
constitutional constructions that may also change over time.”325 In this “dynamic
conception . . . [r]ights become fundamental and timeless . . . when the time is
right for them.”326
A critical role in the “ebb and flow of unenumerated rights” in this model is
played by “sustained political or social mobilization” for or against them.327 Even
the scope of enumerated rights will ebb and flow in response to social and political
mobilizations.328 Balkin cites the Court’s repudiation of Lochnerian freedom of
contract in 1937 as an example of the way constitutional rights can contract as well
as expand.329 As a descriptive model, it is not clear that Balkin’s living originalism
explains constitutional practice better than common-law constitutionalism. The
Lochner Court recognized freedom of contract as a fundamental right not because
of social and political mobilizations in favor of that result, but despite major
mobilizations against it. The Supreme Court in the Progressive Era was not a
Progressive Court. And once the Court recognized freedom of contract as a
fundamental right, it tended to be self-perpetuating, at least until the economic
catastrophe of the 1930s led to a constitutional crisis.
The Equal Protection Clause, in Balkin’s view, is directed not just at
discriminatory executive enforcement or remedies, but also at discriminatory
legislation.330 This broad scope (which accords with modern doctrine), is, in
Balkin’s view, inherent in the original semantic meaning—laws, and not just
officials, “protect.” Of course, other originalists have made the opposite
argument,331 but according to Balkin, “[t]he words ‘equal protection’ mean the
same today as they did in 1868”332—“the original meaning of ‘equal protection’ is
‘equal protection.’”333 “Interpretation-as-ascertainment” yields an empty tautology.
A nonoriginalist might look to current doctrine for the meaning, but if we are not
constrained by doctrine, the possibilities are endless. As David Strauss has argued,
a socialist or social democrat might argue that “equal protection” requires massive
redistribution of wealth;334 a free-market fundamentalist might argue that it
prohibits redistribution; under current doctrine it neither requires nor prohibits
redistribution. Under Balkin’s approach, originalist interpretation-as-ascertainment
does nothing to narrow these possibilities. The real work is done by construction,

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id. at 210.
See id. at 211.
See id.
See id. at 220.
See supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
BALKIN, supra note 36, at 37.
Id. at 104.
See David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1163, 1165 (2012).
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and we are free to reject original constructions and adopt new ones.335
Finally, according to Balkin, the Due Process Clause guaranteed not just “fair
procedures” but also “‘vested’ rights” and “equality before the law.”336 It therefore
overlaps to a certain extent with the other two clauses.
With this theoretical armory at his disposal, Balkin is able to defend virtually
all the results of modern Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, including the holding in
Roe v. Wade,337 the bête noire of conservative originalists. Laws banning abortion,
he argues, violate equal protection because they “impose special burdens on
women not suffered by men,” and force women to become mothers against their
will, keeping them in a “socially dependent status.”338 These laws thus constitute
caste and class legislation. Secondly, Balkin argues, while the right to abortion
may not have been a privilege or immunity of citizens in 1973, when Roe was
decided, there is a “far stronger case” for such a conclusion today.339 While in
1973, when Roe was decided, only a minority of states recognized a right to
abortion, “today, it is likely” that even if Roe were overruled, “an overwhelming
majority of the states would protect some kind of right to abortion.”340
Balkin’s originalism avoids a close adherence to the specific political and
ideological commitments of the framers. The fact that many proponents of the
Fourteenth Amendment argued that it simply constitutionalized the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, Balkin argues, does not demonstrate that the Amendment should be
construed simply to track the Act.341 The Amendment is worded at a higher level
of generality than the Act. Likewise, the framers’ statements that the Fourteenth
Amendment would not require integrated public schools, or legalize racial
intermarriage, may be dismissed as original expected applications not binding on
semantic originalists. But underlying those expectations was in fact a theory or
general principle, the distinction between civil, social and political rights, or what
Balkin calls the “tripartite theory of citizenship.”342 This theory is a general
principle that accounts for many of the framers’ original expected applications.
Nevertheless, Balkin maintains, it is a constitutional construction rather than a
textual principle. Moreover, he argues, the distinctions it embodies are at odds
with our modern understanding of economic and racial equality in the wake of the
New Deal and the civil rights revolution.343 Thus Balkin rejects this original
construction as unacceptable to modern Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
335. See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 222. It is significant that while Calabresi and Rickert argue that
the prohibition of caste discrimination is part of the original semantic meaning (and hence binding),
Balkin contends that the prohibition of caste and the other types of unequal treatment are original
constructions (nonbinding, but to be adopted as normatively desirable). See Balkin, supra note 244.
From a logical and historical perspective, Balkin’s approach is more readily defensible, because, as
discussed above, Calabresi and Rickert resort to expected applications (which they claim to eschew) to
establish their posited semantic meaning.
336. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 246-49.
337. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
338. Balkin, supra note 3, at 323-24.
339. Id. at 336.
340. Id. at 334.
341. See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 264.
342. Id. at 222 (emphasis omitted).
343. See id. at 230-31.
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Balkin’s originalism, which allows for enormous discretion in constitutional
interpretation, is unlikely to prove attractive to most other originalists. While
Balkin seeks to deploy originalist arguments in favor of the right to abortion, he
concedes that “[o]f course people can also use the same interpretive method to
argue against the right to abortion.”344 The same could be said about most other
salient constitutional issues—when the textual meaning and associated “underlying
principles” are articulated at a high enough level of generality, almost any result
that is within the broad scope of current constitutional discourse can be defended.
The rise of originalism and its wide appeal in certain circles is closely connected
with the claim that it alone is able to furnish the constitution with a “fixed
meaning,” and avoid the “invitation to apply current societal values.”345 Thus, it is
not surprising that other originalists have sharply criticized Balkin’s approach,346
which seems largely to collapse the distinction between originalism and
nonoriginalism.347
At the same time, while many nonoriginalists may find Balkin’s embrace of
the transformational role of social movements attractive, they are unlikely to be
fully convinced that originalism is compatible with the living Constitution. Balkin
argues that the most important and productive provisions of the Constitution, such
as the Commerce Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are framed at a
high level of generality and that any supporting or underlying principles should be
framed at a similarly high level of generality. But what if the best historical
evidence shows that this is not the case? What if “commerce” was understood not
as embracing all social interactions but only trade and navigation? What if terms
such as “freedom of speech,” “privileges or immunities,” or “equal protection”
were understood not as broad general principles but as legal terms of art? As we
have seen above, in the case of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Hamburger
and Lash have made different arguments along these lines, yielding different and
much narrower accounts of the Clause’s meaning than the one proposed by Balkin.
Is the binding semantic meaning ascribed to the Clause to vary according to the
latest historical account to find favor with a given judge or other interpreter?
Arguably, Balkin’s account of the original semantic meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment is broader than the text warrants. He claims that the framers’ tripartite
distinction between civil, social, and political rights is not part of the original
meaning, but merely a construction that may be freely rejected by modern
originalists. Yet as Balkin concedes,348 the distinction between civil and political
344. Balkin, supra note 3, at 294.
345. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
346. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core
of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 381 (2007) (stating that it is “difficult to see what is left of a
recognizable originalism” in Balkin’s approach); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public
Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 723, 725 (2009) (arguing that the
original public meaning approach of such scholars as Balkin and Barnett enables the Constitution to be
interpreted “in a way congenial to the aspirations of [the] interpreter,” leading to a wide array of “starkly
different pictures of the Constitution.”).
347. See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
707, 709 (2011) (commenting that “there is no obvious distinction, at least in practice and possibly in
theory, between new new originalism [of scholars such as Balkin and Barnett] and non-originalism”).
348. See BALKIN, supra note 36, at 237.
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rights is presupposed by the text of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates that states might freely
abridge the political rights of women, and that they might abridge the political
rights of black males merely upon penalty of reduced representation. The Fifteenth
Amendment further confirms that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit
racial discrimination in voting rights, for otherwise it would have been
unnecessary. The Fourteenth Amendment’s textual authorization of discrimination
in political rights suggests that the tripartite distinction, or at least the distinction
between civil and political rights, is not just a construction, but a core part of the
Amendment’s original semantic meaning. Under Balkin’s theory, semantic
meaning is unalterable.
Balkin does suggest a solution to this problem, but it will not convince
everyone. The successive extensions of the franchise in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, he argues, give rise to a “general
structural principle” that “there should be no distinction between political and civil
equality for adult citizens without a compelling justification.”349 The reasoning
Balkin employs here is not unlike Justice Douglas’ claim in Griswold v.
Connecticut that a broad constitutional right of privacy arises from “penumbras,
formed by emanations” from specific textual guarantees found in the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.350 Perhaps Justice Douglas’ formulation
does not really deserve all the scorn that has been heaped upon it, but the common
criticism is that the specific guarantees in the text indicate that it does not contain a
broad guarantee of the right to privacy at the level that Justice Douglas articulated
in Griswold. After all, one could equally well construct a Lochnerite fundamental
right to contract and property prohibiting any attempts to redistribute wealth or
equalize bargaining power out of “penumbras and emanations” from the Contracts,
Coinage, and Credit Clauses of Article I, section 10, and the Due Process and
Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.351 Likewise, one may object that the
four amendments extending the franchise did so in specific and limited ways and
did not establish a broad guarantee of voting rights at the level of generality
suggested by Balkin. It is hard to see how his theory is really more satisfying than
the view that the courts, in response to social movements in the past century and a
half, have gradually given meaning to the indeterminate text of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is now read (contrary to the original understanding) to prohibit
irrational discrimination in all sorts of rights, including political rights. The voting
rights decisions of the Warren Court, which invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike down state poll taxes352 and the malapportionment of state legislatures,353 are
349. Id. at 238. Balkin also suggests a second argument for extending the Fourteenth Amendment to
political rights. He argues that political rights, like the right to marry, are fundamental interests
(although not fundamental rights) that “once provided by the state, must be provided equally,” and that
it is a “reasonable construction” to extend the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on the abridgment
of fundamental rights to fundamental interests. Id. at 239-40. Like much else in Balkin’s theory, this
argument makes sense as a matter of logic or political morality, although its relation to the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is unclear.
350. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
351. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500 (18th ed.
2013).
352. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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among the most legitimate exercises of judicial power in American history. But
they are very difficult to justify under any originalist theory.
Moreover, Balkin’s preferred construction of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is utterly unmoored from the original theory underlying the text. As he
observes, the framers tended to cling to a conception of natural rights that “preexist
governments” and that the people “‘have always’ had.”354 To the extent that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was viewed as protecting such rights, they were
seen as fixed, unchanging, and eternal. Of course, the idea that natural rights could
form the basis of a workable legal system was criticized by perspicacious observers
even in the Eighteenth Century355 and seems quaint to most people today.
Balkin, on the other hand, looks to positive law to identify protected privileges
or immunities, which in his conception are emphatically not a set of “fixed
rules.”356 Rather, he suggests that unenumerated fundamental rights may be
identified by looking at what rights the states have “historically or traditionally”
protected, or what rights “almost all of the states have recognized or protected.”357
This is a decidedly positivist conception of rights at odds with the jusnaturalist
assumptions of the framers. Such rights will “ebb and flow,” they will “come and
go” over time: Balkin cites freedom of contract as an example.358 But in an era
where a majority of jurisdictions treated freedom of contract as a fundamental
right, Balkin’s nose-counting approach would tend to continue to impose it even in
the face of broad social mobilizations against it. That is essentially what happened
for more than three decades under Lochnerism. So although Balkin argues that his
approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause is dynamic, it has great potential to
be deployed to protect the status quo.359 It provides no general principle to
distinguish fundamental from nonfundamental rights based on their nature, but
simply protects those rights that have been and are already protected.
3. Barnett: The Libertarian Constitution
Randy Barnett has embraced nearly all the moves that distinguish the new
originalism from its earlier forerunners.360 He disavows reliance on the subjective
intentions of the framers in favor of inquiry into “the public or objective meaning
that a reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional
353. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
354. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 199.
355. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.) (“The ideas of natural
justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject . . . .”); JEREMY BENTHAM, Nonsense Upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND REFORM:
NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 330 (Philip Schofield et
al., eds., Clarendon Press 2002) (1795) (“Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible
rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”).
356. BALKIN, supra note 36, at 199-200.
357. Id. at 210.
358. Id. at 210-11.
359. Cf. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2049-50 (2012) (book
review) (arguing that Balkin’s Living Originalism embraces a Burkean justification of judicial review as
preserving the political status quo).
360. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 714 (2011)
(referring to Barnett as “one of the most prominent New Originalists”).
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provision at the time of its enactment.”361 This hypothetical meaning is generally
to be determined by reference to such sources as “dictionaries, common
contemporary meanings, an analysis of how particular words and phrases are used
elsewhere in the document or in other foundational documents and cases, and
logical inferences from the structure and general purposes of the text.”362 A “richly
detailed legislative history” is not generally required, and “original meaning
originalists need not concern themselves” with the specific intended applications of
the language used, except as “circumstantial evidence” of the meaning of technical
words and phrases.363
In practice, however, Barnett’s analysis of key constitutional provisions,
including the Necessary and Proper Clause,364 the Commerce Clause,365 the Ninth
Amendment,366 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause,367 relies heavily on the
same sort of resort to legislative history and statements of subjective
understandings as the old originalism. Based largely on evidence drawn from
legislative history (though not a terribly “richly detailed” one),368 Barnett concludes
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a broad set of rights that include
both natural rights (enumerated and unenumerated) and positive-law rights.369 The
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by importing the
language of the Privileges and Immunities Clause (Comity Clause) of Article IV,
incorporated the antebellum understanding exemplified in such decisions as
Corfield v. Coryell,370 which identified these rights as consisting both of the natural
rights retained by the people, as well as “such positive civil rights as the ‘protection
of government’ that one receives in exchange for surrendering one’s power of
enforcement” of natural rights to the state.371 Barnett highlights the repeated
reliance on Article IV and Corfield by the leading proponents of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, such as Senator Trumbull and Representatives Wilson and
Lawrence.372 Finally, he points to Senator Howard’s speech, which quoted at
361. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 92.
362. Id. at 93 (citations omitted).
363. Id.
364. See id. at 155-90.
365. See id. at 278-94.
366. See id. at 235-42.
367. See id. at 60-68.
368. Cf. Jack N. Rakove, Book Review, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 660, 667 (2005) (“Barnett’s
examination of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment is too cursory to satisfy anyone who wants to
reason from robust evidence rather than imaginative inference.”). Barnett’s discussion contains some
careless errors. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 39, at 61 (referring to Representative John A. Bingham
of Ohio, the principal draftsman of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as “Senator” Bingham); id.
at 193 (referring to Bingham as “John Bingham of New York” (Bingham never lived in New York)); id.
at 63-64 (repeatedly referring to Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, the principal draftsman of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as Lyman “Trumbell”).
369. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 61 (arguing that “while ‘privileges or immunities’ includes
natural rights, it is a broader term that includes additional rights.”).
370. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa.1823) (No. 3,230).
371. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 63.
372. See id. at 63-64. While these legislators stressed that the Civil Rights Act protected natural
rights, Barnett cites Lawrence as confirming that the privileges and immunities protected by Article IV
included positive rights as well. See id. at 65. Lawrence did state, as Barnett observes, that privileges
and immunities include both rights “inherent in every citizen of the United States, and such others as
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length from Corfield’s explication of privileges and immunities (a set of rights that
“cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature”), and added to
those “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of
the Constitution.”373
Given the vagueness of the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,374
Barnett’s resort to legislative history to elucidate its meaning is understandable.
Yet a more careful and richly detailed account of these same materials (which
Barnett eschews as unnecessary) would cast doubt on his claim that the very broad
meaning he attributes to the Privileges or Immunities Clause is the meaning that a
reasonable contemporary observer would attribute to it. Although various
legislators referred to natural rights, and Howard and (more obliquely) Bingham
adverted to incorporation or something similar, the most common meaning
attributed to the Clause was that it simply prohibited discrimination in the same
limited set of positive state law rights (such as property, contract, and access to the
courts) protected by the Civil Rights Act. 375 The more closely one looks at the
debates over framing and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the more
difficult it is to assert that there existed a single widely-held historical
understanding of its meaning or to declare with confidence exactly what “objective
meaning” a “reasonable listener” would attach to its language.
Under Barnett’s theory, the Ninth Amendment requires “the strict construction
of any power that restricts the exercise of individual liberty, whether that liberty is
enumerated or unenumerated,”376 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment refers to “the same set of unenumerable rights.”377 Yet
Barnett cites no statements during the framing and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment linking its Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Ninth Amendment.
The only specific support he cites for equating the two is a post-ratification remark
by Senator John Sherman that “the privileges, immunities, and rights . . . of citizens
of the United States,” as the Ninth Amendment recognizes, are “innumerable,” and
must be sought not only in the Constitution, but also in “every scrap of American
history,” in “the history of England,” and in “the common law.”378
Yet as Kurt Lash has argued, although one can point to some “sporadic
attempts to read the Ninth” Amendment during Reconstruction as a guarantee of
may be conferred by local law and pertain only to the citizen of the State.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1836 (1866). But in the next sentence he “conced[es], as the courts have held, that the
privileges referred to in the Constitution are such as are fundamental civil rights, not political rights nor
those dependent on local law.” Id.
373. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 65 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Howard)).
374. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE
TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 51-52, 60 (1988) (arguing that the language of Privileges or Immunities Clause
was vague and ambiguous and that as a consequence the text of “[s]ection one simply fails to specify at
all the particular rights to which it applies.”).
375. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism
Meets the Fourteenth Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 361, 381 (2009) (“The single most frequently expressed understanding of the
proposed amendment was that it constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).
376. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 242.
377. Id. at 66.
378. Id. at 67 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman)).
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personal rights capable of being incorporated against the states, there “are far more
numerous statements on (and applications of) the Ninth as a federalist rule of
construction.”379 If the Ninth Amendment were understood as a broad guarantee of
individual rights, it is certainly odd that the antislavery constitutionalists, otherwise
so creative in their interpretation of the text, never relied on it, and that the leading
proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment cited as favoring incorporation, such as
Howard and Bingham, never referred to it.380 However, Lash notes, the Ninth
Amendment was frequently invoked by slaveholders and secessionists.381
Although central to Barnett’s constitutional theory, the Ninth Amendment appears
to have been of marginal importance for the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
If the terms privileges or immunities (separately or in combination) were
understood to refer to natural rights (or to positive rights acquired in exchange for
the loss of certain natural rights), that tells us little specifically about what those
rights were. While natural rights theorists often speak as if the concept of natural
rights is a perfectly clear one on which a stable and determinate legal doctrine can
be based, that has never been the case. As Justice Iredell wisely said: “The ideas of
natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men
have differed upon the subject . . . .”382
Barnett argues that while the Slaughter-House Cases383 departed from the
original meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the doctrine of
substantive due process that emerged in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely repaired the damage,
“restor[ing] rather than violat[ing] the original historical meaning of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment taken as a whole.”384 Barnett enthusiastically endorses
the Court’s jurisprudence during this era, including the decision that most modern
scholars have treated as emblematic of judicial overreaching: Lochner v. New
York.385 According to Barnett, “[t]he majority’s position [in Lochner] can most
accurately be characterized as adopting the conception of civil rights or ‘privileges
or immunities’ held by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.”386 The
Lochner Court deployed what Barnett calls a “Presumption of Liberty”387 that
included vigorous judicial protection of contract and property rights. In the wake
of the New Deal, the Court abandoned this approach in favor of a general
presumption of constitutionality and currently grants heightened protection only to
specifically enumerated rights and to a “judicially favored”388 subset of
unenumerated rights deemed fundamental.
379. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597, 645 n.222
(2005).
380. See id. at 647-48; see also Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment,
64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 131, 144 (1988) (noting failure of abolitionists to invoke Ninth Amendment).
381. See Lash, supra note 379, at 648.
382. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.).
383. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
384. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 208.
385. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
386. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 215.
387. Id. at 259.
388. Id. at 232.
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The choice between the Lochner era’s “Presumption of Liberty” and the
modern presumption of constitutionality, Barnett writes, “is largely a matter of
constitutional construction” rather than interpretation, because the constitutional
text “does not explicitly establish any presumption.”389 Yet elsewhere he suggests
the opposite: the modern Court’s presumption of constitutionality is
“incompatibl[e] . . . with the text of the Constitution”390 and “violate[s]” the Ninth
Amendment.391
Of course, the presumption of liberty cannot be absolute, for otherwise
government could scarcely exist. Barnett recognizes that government must have
the power “to prohibit wrongful or regulate rightful activity.”392 So where is the
line between rightful and wrongful activity, and between proper and improper
regulation? Barnett argues that the line is largely (though perhaps not entirely) that
drawn by judge-made common law: “The freedom to act within the boundaries
provided by one’s common law or ‘civil’ rights may be viewed as a central
background presumption of the Constitution.”393 He is willing to admit that
legislation “can occasionally be used”394 to alter the common law, but insists that
such legislation should be “comparatively rare.”395 The more the legislature acts to
alter common-law rights, the greater judicial skepticism is warranted.396
Barnett’s constitutional presumption of liberty, which he concedes is a matter
of construction rather than interpretation, seems to derive, as Trevor Morrison has
argued, “not from the Constitution itself, but from the libertarian ideology
Professor Barnett reads into the Constitution.”397 Furthermore, while the framers
cherished the common law and undoubtedly incorporated many common-law
institutions (such as trial by jury and the writ of habeas corpus) into the
Constitution, Barnett provides little support for his sweeping claim that the
common law establishes general background presumptions against which the
constitutional propriety of legislation may be measured. Madison emphatically
rejected the notion that the common law was “adopted or recognized by the
constitution.”398 For example, the common law of seditious libel treated criticism
of the government as wrongful, but it is far from clear that the First Amendment
incorporates that view. As Madison said, “[i]f it be understood that the common
law is established by the constitution” then “all its incongruities, barbarisms, and
bloody maxims would be inviolably saddled on the good people of the United
States.”399 Barnett seems to envisage that the line between rightful and wrongful
389. Id. at 223.
390. Id. at 224.
391. Id. at 242; see also id. at 252 (arguing that the modern Court’s approach, unlike the presumption
of liberty, “is a construction that runs afoul of the text”).
392. Id. at 262.
393. Id. at 263.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 264.
396. See id.
397. Trevor W. Morrison, Lamenting Lochner’s Loss: Randy Barnett’s Case for a Libertarian
Constitution, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 856 (2005) (book review).
398. JAMES MADISON, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, in WRITINGS 608, 641 (Jack N. Rakove
ed., 1999).
399. Id. at 639.
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conduct should be determined by reference to state common law400 rather than
some general or federal common law, which only raises additional problems. As
Madison recognized, state common law cannot provide a uniform standard by
which to measure the constitutionality of legislation under the federal Constitution,
because even prior to the Revolution, “[t]he common law was not the same in any
two of the colonies.”401 Since that time, the number of state jurisdictions, and the
divergences among them, have only multiplied. State common law cannot provide
a unified standard for adjudication of federal constitutional rights and powers,
much less a fixed one.402
Barnett’s approach, which is deeply suspicious of legislation, extends and
elevates to constitutional status the maxim that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be strictly construed. But it is unclear why judge-made private
law should set the constitutional contours of public legislative power. Certainly
neither constitutional text nor original meaning establishes any such presumption.
The founders did not make a fetish of the common law,403 much less elevate it to
constitutional status.404
Despite these problems there is much of value in Barnett’s constitutional
vision. He is certainly right to seek to ground his theory of constitutional
interpretation not in assertions of the authority of the framers to bind their posterity,
but rather in an inquiry into the constitutional foundations of a just and workable
political order. He makes a persuasive case for a wider scope for constitutional
liberty in many areas, for example, as a check on our cruel, wasteful, and
counterproductive drug laws.405 But his argument for a revival of the Lochnerian
protections of property and contract rights is not textually or historically
persuasive. Such an approach, by entrenching the power of economically powerful
elites, is more likely to restrict than enhance the liberty of most ordinary people.
III. CONCLUSION
By casting Section One in the language of privileges or immunities and due
process, the framers could claim that it effected no radical change but simply made
already existing constitutional guarantees enforceable. Differences between
400. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 263 (stating that articulation of common-law “rules and
principles” distinguishing rightful from wrongful conduct is “primarily made by state court judges”).
401. MADISON, supra note 398, at 633.
402. See Morrison, supra note 397, at 863-64 (“By allowing private law doctrines of tort, contract,
and property to define constitutional rights, Professor Barnett necessarily assumes that constitutional
rights will change over time. . . . [T]his is an originalism that only a ‘living constitutionalist’ could
love.”).
403. For example, Jefferson was quite suspicious of common-law adjudication, and “trusted the
legislature more than the judges.” David Thomas Konig, Legal Fictions and the Rule(s) of Law: The
Jeffersonian Critique of Common-Law Adjudication, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 97,
116 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001).
404. As Trevor Morrison has argued, the common law, which is largely “designed to mediate
relationships between private parties,” may prioritize goals such as economic efficiency over
constitutionally paramount values such as liberty and equality. Morrison, supra note 397, at 864-65.
405. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 349-50. Cf. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (arguing that the drug laws have
created a new caste system in America).
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radicals, moderates, and conservatives were submerged in a text that all could agree
upon, because each member of Congress and of the ratifying public was free to
read it in his own way. The Fourteenth Amendment was a mirror in which each
found reflected his own political views and vision of a just constitutional order.
This phenomenon is typical in constitution-making. We are able to agree on
abstract terms such as “freedom of speech,” prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishments,” protection of the “privileges and immunities of citizens,” “due
process,” and “equal protection” precisely because we attach our own meanings to
these terms.
The basic difficulty in seeking to elucidate the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment is that, as William Nelson put it, “[s]ection one simply fails
to specify at all the particular rights to which it applies.”406 The framers and
ratifiers were agreed on a basic principle of equality but could not agree on its
specific content. Indeed, the “ultimate emptiness” of the principle was a condition
“essential to creating the supermajorities” required to assure passage and
ratification.407 In particular, the Amendment does not specify the rights protected,
the nature of the protection (whether absolute or only against discriminatory
treatment), or the criterion for determining protected classes. Judicial decisions
over the course of the last one hundred forty years have succeeded in resolving
these questions in substantial detail. An attempt to return to the original
understanding would completely unsettle the law and create utter chaos in the
constitutional protection of human rights.
If the framing generation had no common understanding of Section One, it is
hardly surprising that a century and a half later there is no consensus among
scholars as to its original meaning. Indeed, the quest for a single “original
meaning” is a misguided one. The diversity of original understandings presents
intractable difficulties that cannot be overcome by the fiction of a single original
“objective” meaning that a hypothetical “reasonable observer” would attribute to
the text. We are forced to inquire: What are the political and ideological
commitments of that reasonable observer? In what contexts does the observer
situate the text? What is the observer’s understanding of existing constitutional and
legal norms? There is no neutral or objective way of answering these questions.
Any attempt to reduce the multiplicity of possible original understandings to a
single original meaning is a distortion and ultimately a falsification of history.
In addition to abandoning the search for actual historical meaning in favor of a
hypothetical “objective” meaning, recent originalist scholars also deploy the
distinction between interpretation and construction. This distinction enables them
to dismiss as mere “constructions” or “subjective expected applications” statements
by the framers that privileges and immunities did not include political rights (such
as the right to vote or serve on juries) or social rights (such as the right to
intermarry or attend common schools), or that gender discrimination involves no
inequality. But if these statements can be dismissed as mere subjective expected
applications, why not also statements by the framers that the Amendment protected
core civil rights to hold property, or to move about freely, or to testify in court, or
406. NELSON, supra note 374, at 60.
407. Id. at 80.
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that it prohibited racial discrimination with respect to those rights? Given the
vagueness of the text, the distinction between interpretation and construction is
arbitrary and almost infinitely manipulable. It can be used to contract or expand
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment at will.
On the one hand, a modern interpreter cannot help viewing the text in light of
the meanings it has acquired over decades of constitutional interpretation by the
people, their elected representatives, and the courts. We tend to view central tenets
of modern doctrine as essential components of the original meaning, so that, for
example, originalists tend to insist that the Amendment prohibits racial segregation
in public education, as the Court held in Brown v. Board of Education, even if the
framers almost universally rejected that view.408 Originalist inquiry is inevitably
subject to what a contemporary of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
sardonically called “the law of retrospection, which presents all the past as a
preparation for the accomplished fact.”409
On the other hand, the originalist scholar will often tend to emphasize the
historical evidence that best accords with her own ethical and political values and
commitments. This phenomenon of “confirmation bias” is one that philosophers
have long been familiar with and is amply confirmed in the psychological
literature.410 It is not necessarily the case that originalists consciously select and
emphasize only that evidence that supports their own commitments, but as human
beings they often do so unintentionally and even unwittingly.
In reading the debates and discussions of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, one cannot help being struck by participants’ seriousness,
learning, foresight, and oratorical skill, and by their determination to forge a more
free and just world. Our own age, with its debased and trivial political and
journalistic culture, has much to learn from theirs, if only we would listen. The
leaders of the Radical Republicans, such as Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner,
and the great nineteenth-century advocates for human rights like Frederick
Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan B. Anthony, though lesser known,
deserve the title of founders of our nation as much as Washington, Jefferson,
Adams, and Madison. Yet we also find in these debates, even among the
Republicans, examples of petty bigotry, political cravenness, and opportunism.
Our Constitution will be enriched if we draw upon the best of their legacy but do
not seek to stifle and simplify it by a reductionist quest for a single original
meaning.
408. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947 (1995) (arguing, primarily based on post-enactment evidence, that the school desegregation
decisions are consistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment). For discussion,
see Boyce, supra note 25, at 998-1001.
409. LEO TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 709 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans., Vintage
Books 2007) (1869).
410. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). As Nickerson observes, Francis Bacon accurately described
this phenomenon nearly four centuries ago: “The human understanding when it has once adopted an
opinion . . . draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there be a greater number and
weight of instances to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by
some distinction sets aside and rejects . . . .” Id. at 176 (quoting Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 24, 36 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939)).
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The various meanings ascribed to the Fourteenth Amendment by its framers
and ratifiers are a starting point of an ongoing process by which its meaning has
evolved to this day and will continue to evolve in the future. Their struggles for
freedom and equality should remain a constant source of inspiration to their
posterity. But to insist that their multifarious understandings can be reduced to a
single original meaning is to traduce our own history and constitutional traditions.
Moreover, we should not ignore the ways in which the Amendment’s meaning has
been enriched by the struggles of succeeding generations. Through the gradual
evolution of its meaning, our living Constitution has come to embody the
accumulated wisdom of past and present generations, over time rendering its
protections of liberty and equality broader, more concrete, and more secure.

